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THE FIRST AMENDMENT LOST IN
TRANSLATION: PREVENTING FOREIGN
INFLUENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS AFTER
CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
Matt A. Vega*
This Article invites readers to consider an unusual approach to
curtailing the threat of foreign corruption: limiting political speech.
This Article argues that permitting foreign-owned and foreigncontrolled corporations to pour money into U.S. elections has
undermined self-governance and threatens our democracy. By
exploring both constitutional and extra-constitutional theory, this
Article adds several novel arguments to the ongoing debate on the First
Amendment’s relationship to campaign finance laws governing foreign
corporations.
The basic question this Article addresses is whether the First
Amendment protects political spending by foreign-controlled or
foreign-owned U.S. corporations. This issue has become more pressing
since the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC decided, in a 5–4
vote, to strike down virtually any limits on independent expenditures by
domestic corporations. However, the conclusions reached in that case
are not binding on the very different question of whether the
government has a compelling state interest in preventing foreign
influence or distortion vis-à-vis the financial participation of foreigncontrolled or foreign-owned domestic corporations in U.S elections.
Understanding the potential impact of Citizens United on
legislative efforts to prevent foreign influence on U.S. politics is an
extremely timely topic. In his 2010 State of the Union Address,
President Obama criticized the Citizens United decision for opening the
* Associate Professor of Law, Faulkner University—Thomas Goode Jones School of Law.
J.D., Yale Law School, 1993. Formerly in-house counsel for Federal Express Corporation, the
author was responsible for the company’s legal compliance with anti-corruption and antiterrorism laws worldwide. A special thanks to Associate Dean Brenda C. See for her support in
obtaining a research grant to make this Article possible and to my research assistants, Joseph
Campbell and Joseph Van Zandt, for their able help.
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floodgates on political spending by foreign corporations’ U.S.
subsidiaries. He called for a congressional response in the form of
stronger campaign finance laws. On June 21, 2010, the House passed
the DISCLOSE Act which, among other things, would extend the
current ban on foreign contributions and independent expenditures to
foreign-controlled and foreign-owned corporations. The Senate,
however, has thus far failed to reach agreement on the Senate version
of the bill.
This Article provides an analytical and historical framework for
predicting whether the current legislative proposal would pass
constitutional muster. I offer three possible approaches: (1) lowering
the standard from traditional strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny,
(2) applying an “antidistortion” rationale limited to cases involving
foreign influence, or (3) classifying the restricted political speech as
impermissibly “coordinated” with foreign principals as suggested by
dicta in the Supreme Court’s latest free speech case Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project.
The United States has long been the global leader in fighting
corruption abroad. However, a great deal of foreign corruption
remains in our own back yard. For example, the recent BP oil spill may
prove to be a direct consequence of BP using its political clout to get
regulators to look the other way. My hope is this Article will further the
dialogue on how foreign corruption occurs in the United States in the
form of foreign corporate influence on (and distortion of) our political
process, even as it offers some possible solutions for determining when
and how foreign-controlled corporate political speech may be limited
for the benefit of our society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC1 has
prompted the Obama administration and Congress to push for stricter
campaign finance laws.2 As Justice Stevens pointed out in his partial
dissent, the decision overruled decades of campaign finance law
precedent.3 It effectively rendered any limits on “independent
expenditures” by corporations—or at least by domestic
corporations—unconstitutional.4 Last year the House passed the
DISCLOSE Act,5 which—among other things—would have required
stricter methods of campaign finance disclosure6 and prohibited
foreign influence in federal elections.7 Although current law already
bans direct contributions and independent expenditures by foreign
citizens and foreign corporations,8 this legislation would have
extended to foreign-controlled domestic corporations and their
political action committees (PACs) to close the loopholes permitting
the expenditure of foreign money in U.S. elections.9 However,
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. In his January 23 radio address, the president argued that “[e]ven foreign corporations
may now get into the act” of spending “an unlimited amount of special interest money” for
political purposes. President Barack Obama, Weekly Address (Jan. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-vows-continuestanding-special-interests-behalf-amer.
3. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 936.
4. Id. at 913. An “independent expenditure” is defined as any expenditure “expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate” (e.g., a “vote for,” “vote
against” or other so-called “magic word” communication), which is “not made in concert or
cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized
political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(17)(A)–(B) (2006).
5. DISCLOSE Act is short for Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending
in Elections Act. See WE WANT THE DISCLOSE ACT, http://www.discloseact.com (last visited
May 23, 2011).
6. DISCLOSE Act, H.R. Res. 5175, 111th Cong. §§ 201–301 (2010) (enacted).
7. Id. § 102.
8. For purposes of this Article, “foreign corporation” means a corporation that is not
created or organized in the United States. “Contributions” are legally defined as “any gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the
purpose of influencing any election for Federal Office” or “the payment by any person of
compensation for the personal services of another person which are rendered to a political
committee without charge for any purpose.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A). The key detail that separates
contributions from expenditures is that contributions are made directly to a candidate, campaign,
or political party.
9. It is illegal for foreign individuals and corporations to financially participate in federal
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legislators have been unable so far to push the DISCLOSE Act
through the Senate.10 In the interim, the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) has suspended enforcement of any regulations
that are inconsistent with the Citizens United decision but has
rejected the first two drafts of a notice of proposed rulemaking
because the FEC is deadlocked over the proper scope of the
regulations to implement the Supreme Court’s decision.11
The growing political influence of foreign corporations poses a
very real threat to our nation’s sovereignty and to our right to
political self-determination.12 Foreign money may affect not only
elections, but foreign-controlled and foreign-owned corporations, subsidiaries, trade associations
and PACs can contribute and expend funds to influence federal elections. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 175–77.
11. See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Statement on the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Citizens United v. FEC (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/
press2010/20100205CitizensUnited.shtml (stating among other things that the FEC “will no
longer enforce statutory and regulatory provisions prohibiting corporations and labor union from
making either independent expenditures or electioneering communications”); Press Release, Fed.
Election Comm’n, FEC Votes on Two Drafts of an NPRM on Independent Expenditures and
Electioneering Communications, Approves Final Audit Report (Jan. 20, 2011), available at
http://fec.gov/press/20110120OpenMeeting.shtml (stating that Draft A included revisions to the
regulations governing financial participation by foreign nationals in the U.S. electoral process,
while Draft B did not); Statement of Vice Chair Caroline C. Hunter and Commissioners Donald
F. McGahn II and Matthew S. Petersen on Notice of Proposed Citizens United Rulemaking,
Federal Election Commission (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.fec.gov/members/statements/
GOPCommissionersCNPRMStatement1-20-11.pdf (providing a statement by the three
commissioners appointed by Republicans explaining that “our colleagues [the three
commissioners appointed by Democrats] support a much broader rulemaking”). The FEC has
reportedly delayed taking any action on new regulations because of divisions among the three
Democratic and three Republican FEC commissioners. Campaign Spending: FEC, IRS Unlikely
to Act Soon to Clarify Regulations for Disclosure, Officials Say, BNA MONEY & POL. REP. (Dec.
7, 2010) [hereinafter Campaign Spending] (on file with author). The Commission did, however,
publish a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the NPRM on Coordinated
Communications originally published on October 21, 2009, to elicit comments addressing the
impact of Citizens United on the Commission’s proposed rules on coordinated communications.
Supplemental NPRM, 75 Fed. Reg. 6590 (proposed Oct. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt.
109.21).
12. See 156 CONG. REC. S6277–78 (daily ed. July 27, 2010) (remarks by Sen. Sherrod
Brown) (stating, prior to the vote denying cloture to the Senate version of the DISCLOSE Act
blaming foreign special interests for thwarting legislative reform efforts in the past, “We saw the
big companies that outsource jobs write trade agreements, such as NAFTA and CAFTA. [W]e
were all unsuccessful in the Bush years—with regard to writing energy legislation, we saw the oil
companies [many of them foreign owned] do that.”); see also 156 CONG. REC. H4787 (daily ed.
June 24, 2010) (remarks by Rep. McGovern) (pointing to the potential danger that now looms
with China controlling so many domestic corporations within the U.S. and stating “[s]overeign
wealth funds, the investment funds controlled by foreign governments of foreign interests, could
be controlled by China. If they’re here in the United States, they have the right to be able to under
an innocuous name spend millions and millions of dollars in negative ads against a candidate or
positive ads for a candidate.”).
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election outcomes but also policy decisions of incumbent politicians
who are mindful of future campaign needs. As they expand their
operations here, foreign corporations exert political influence
primarily through lobbying and campaign spending. During the last
presidential election, foreign entities spent an unprecedented amount
of money on both political parties.13 Records show that U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign companies donated more than $15.5 million in
the 2010 federal election cycle through foreign-controlled PACs.14
That figure does not include millions of dollars donated by these
corporations’ individual employees.15 Now under Citizens United, as
Justice Stevens warned in his dissent, foreign corporations, through
their American subsidiaries, stand to gain even more influence over
the body politic.16
This situation is made worse by the so-called secret money
loophole in current campaign finance law, which permits tax-exempt
organizations to receive large donations from undisclosed corporate
donors.17 In the 2010 congressional midterm elections, spending by
such tax-exempt organizations was up five-fold from 2006.18 Half of
the $293 million spent by organizations other than candidates and
parties during that election cycle came from groups that refused to
13. The majority of the money comes from individual officers and employees of foreigncontrolled or foreign-owned domestic corporations or affiliated PACs. Presidential Donor
Lookup Results, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/
search.php?cid=&name=%28all%29&employ=Credit+Suisse+Securities&state=%28all%29&zip
=%28any+zip%29&submit=OK&amt=a&sort=A (last visited Jan. 22, 2011); see Presidential
Campaign
Finance
Records,
FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/
DisclosureSearch/mapApp.do (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
14. Foreign-Connected PACs, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/
pacs/foreign.php?cycle=2010 (last visited July 2, 2011).
15. While lists of individual donors are available from the FEC, analyzing the data can prove
tricky as not all donors choose to disclose their occupation and place of employment, and many
choose to list their business affiliations in different ways. This can lead to totals that are fuzzy at
best. 111th Congress, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/
candlist.php?congno=111&sort=S (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (listing campaign financing for each
member of the 111th Congress); Presidential Campaign Finance, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/DisclosureSearch/mapApp.do (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (providing an
opportunity to search for individual donors). A sampling of data taken August 1, 2010, for
purposes of this Article totaled over $2.6 million, and is on file with the author.
16. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (warning that corporations are
very different from natural persons because “[u]nlike voters in U.S. elections, corporations may
be foreign controlled”).
17. Campaign Spending, supra note 11.
18. T.W. Farnam & Dan Eggen, Interest-Group Spending for Midterm Up Fivefold from
2006;
Many
Sources
Secret,
WASH. POST
(Oct.
4,
2010,
3:01
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/03/AR2010100303664.html.
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reveal their funding sources.19 For example, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce has expanded its fundraising considerably since Citizens
United and has received hundreds of thousands of dollars in
donations from foreign businesses in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of
Bahrain, India, and many other countries.20
There is little reason to believe that these foreign companies act
in the United States’ best interest. Take, for example, BP and the
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig in the Gulf of
Mexico in April 2010. Many experts believe that the resulting oil
spill, the largest such disaster in U.S. history, was because of BP and
other foreign oil and gas companies influencing the federal
government to allow deep-water oil drilling to go virtually
unsupervised.21 In 2009, according to the Center for Responsive
Politics, BP spent nearly $16 million lobbying Congress and the
federal government.22 Individual BP directors, officers, and
employees donated at least $160,000 to congressional candidates and
their political parties.23 If campaign donations to PACs are counted,
the total amount spent by BP employees in 2009 is over $1 million.24
During his time in the Senate and while running for president,
Barack Obama received a total of $77,051 from BP and is the top
recipient of BP PAC and individual donations over the past twenty
years.25 It now appears these “foreign” dollars, and the political
19. Half of Outside Spending in Campaigns Came from Groups Not Revealing Donors, BNA
MONEY & POL. REP. (Nov. 12, 2010) (on file with author).
20. Lee Fang, Foreign-Funded ‘U.S.’ Chamber of Commerce Running Partisan Attack Ads,
THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 5, 2010, 10:22 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/2010/10/05/foreignchamber-commerce/. Foreign firms like BP, Shell Oil, and Siemens are active members of the
Chamber. Id.
21. See Brian Montopoli, BP Spent Millions on Lobbying, Campaign Donations, CBS NEWS
(May 5, 2010, 3:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20004240-503544.html.
22. Michael Beckel, Federal Contributions from Political Action Committee of Beleaguered
Oil Giant BP Slow to a Trickle, OPEN SECRETS BLOG CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (July 20,
2010, 11:44 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/07/federal-contributions-frompolitica.html. BP was on track to spend a similar amount for 2010, spending $3.5 million on
lobbying during the first three months of the year. Alan Fram & Sharon Theimer, Will BP’s D.C.
Connections Help It Now?, CBS NEWS (May 10, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/
05/10/politics/main6470916.shtml. However, BP became politically radioactive after the spill,
causing several politicians to return their monies. Beckel, supra.
23. Gina-Marie Cheeseman, How BP Money Spent on Lobbying and Campaign
Contributions Pays Off, TRIPLE PUNDIT (May 13, 2010), http://www.triplepundit.com/2010/05/
how-bp-money-spends-on-lobbying-and-campaign-contributions-pays-off/#ixzz0sAHwGjSg.
24. Id.
25. Erica Lovely, Obama Biggest Recipient of BP Cash, POLITICO (May 5, 2010, 5:37 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/36783.html#ixzz0sAMk1mjD.
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influence they bought, may have caused the U.S. Minerals
Management Service to rubber-stamp the Deepwater Horizon oil
rig’s safety inspection.26
This Article examines the little-scrutinized political speech
rights of foreign corporations and their American affiliates and
concludes that, despite some strong arguments to the contrary,
federal legislation may constitutionally restrict these rights.27 Part II
briefly reviews the historical efforts of the Framers, the legislature,
and the FEC to limit foreign influence over the American political
process. Part III addresses the Supreme Court’s treatment of
corporate political spending in Citizens United as “central to the
meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”28 In particular, Part
III considers the decision’s effect on the existing regulatory ban on
campaign spending by foreign corporations. Part IV then explores
several possible theories under which Congress may restrict the
financial participation of foreign-controlled or foreign-owned
domestic corporations in U.S. elections under the Constitution, or
alternatively under extra-constitutional principles that weigh against
judicial interference in foreign policy.
The Article concludes that financial participation by foreign
corporations in U.S. elections should be categorized as wholly
26. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING
(2011),
available
at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf. Specifically, the Final Report found that
“pockets of corruption” contributed to Minerals Management Service inspectors’ lax enforcement
along with problems with understaffing, underfunding, and lack of training. Id. at 76–79, 254–55;
see also Laura Strickler, Oil Spill: Feds Won’t Release BP Inspection Records, CBS NEWS
(May 11, 2010, 5:10 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20004695-10391695.html.
27. Adeno Addis, Who’s Afraid of Foreigners? The Restrictions on Alien Ownership of
Electronic Media, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 133 (2000); Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely
Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283 (2010); Ian M. Rose,
Barring Foreigners from Our Airwaves: An Anachronistic Pothole on the Global Information
Highway, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1188 (1995); Note, “Foreign” Campaign Contributions and the
First Amendment, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1886 (1997); Katherine L. Pringle, Note, Silencing the
Speech of Strangers: Constitutional Values and the First Amendment Rights of Resident Aliens,
81 GEO. L.J. 2073 (1993); see also Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien
Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 59 MO. L. REV.
569 (1994) (arguing for application of at least intermediate scrutiny for classifications of
“corporate nationality” under the Equal Protection clause). See generally J. Robert Abraham,
Saving Buckley: Creating a Stable Campaign Finance Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078,
1081 (2010) (discussing constitutional limits on American campaign finance regulations after
Buckley).
28. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892. The Court also described it as “archetypical political
speech.” Id.
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unprotected speech under the First Amendment and lawfully
banned.29 This conclusion is based on the extra-constitutional
principles of sovereignty and the right to self-determination, as well
as national security concerns. The Article then explores whether
Congress should expand the current ban on foreign campaign
spending to foreign-controlled and foreign-owned domestic
corporations. It considers whether the political-question doctrine
requires judicial deference to congressional legislation or whether the
enforcement of such legislation may be based on the United States’
inherent sovereignty. Because foreign-controlled or foreign-owned
domestic corporations are still technically American speakers,
however, the Article predicts that the Supreme Court would likely
refuse to abdicate its judicial role of evaluating the First Amendment
claims arising from such legislation. Nevertheless, the Article argues
that the First Amendment may permit foreign-controlled and foreignowned domestic corporations to be restricted, even banned, from
participating financially in U.S. elections under three possible
approaches: (1) lowering the standard of judicial review in such
cases to intermediate scrutiny, (2) applying an “antidistortion”
rationale limited to cases involving foreign influence,30 or
(3) classifying the restricted political speech as impermissibly
“coordinated” with foreign principals as suggested by dicta in Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP).31
The prospect of lowering the applicable standard of scrutiny is
based on the HLP decision, which held that the proper standard for
evaluating a similar restriction on speech was whether the law is
“necessary” to further a government interest of “the highest order.”32
The second option argues that the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
antidistortion rationale in Citizens United should be limited to the
facts in that case, which involved a purely domestic corporation;
therefore, Citizens United is not controlling in First Amendment
cases involving foreign-owned or foreign-controlled speakers. The
third option recognizes that even if extending the ban from 2 U.S.C.
29. This argument assumes that the speaker is both alien and outside the United States.
30. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
31. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2711 (2010). The Court held that the U.S. government could ban speech
by American individuals and nonprofit groups coordinated with, directed at, or controlled by
foreign terrorist organizations. Id. at 2710.
32. Id. at 2724.
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§ 441e33 (“Section 441e”) to foreign-controlled or foreign-owned
American companies is subject to strict scrutiny, a legislative
proposal could be narrowly tailored. For example, such a narrowly
tailored proposal could cover only coordinated expenditures (which
are broadly defined under HLP) to achieve a compelling state interest
in preventing foreign influence in U.S. elections.
II. PAST, CURRENT, AND FUTURE EFFORTS TO
LIMIT FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS
A. Historical Background
1. Fears of Foreign Corruption in Colonial America
One of the Framers’ greatest fears during the Federal
Convention of 1787 was foreign corruption.34 The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention “were concerned that the small size of the
young country (compared to the great European powers) would open
it up to foreign corruption.”35 They debated whether a stronger
national government or something more akin to the existing league
of states was better equipped to “secure the Union against the
influence of foreign powers over its members.”36 New York delegate
Melancton Smith stressed that “[f]oreign corruption is . . . to be
guarded against.”37 Charles Pinckney, who represented South
Carolina at the Convention, spoke of the “peculiar danger and
impropriety in opening [the Senate’s] door to those who have foreign
attachments.”38 Similarly, Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry
33. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006).
34. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 347 (2009).
35. Id. at 353. Although Teachout argues that the Framers had broader concerns about the
internal corruption of America’s politicians and citizenry, she admits those concerns were “often
intermingled” with concerns about foreign power. Id. at 358. While the majority in Citizens
United gave short shrift to Teachout’s concerns about moral decay, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
928, the Court would be well advised to pay greater deference to the long-standing determination
that foreign powers and individuals have no place in American politics. I argue in this Article that
concerns about foreign influence preclude political spending by both foreign corporations and
their American subsidiaries that have inherent “foreign” (read non-patriotic) allegiances.
36. James Madison, Opposition to the New Jersey Plan (June 19, 1787), in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 79, 83 (Ralph Ketcham
ed., 1986).
37. Speeches of Melancton Smith (June 20–27, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 36, at 336, 346.
38. Citizenship for Immigrants (Aug. 9, 1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 36, at 156, 156 (quoting Charles
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feared that new states “may even be under some foreign influence”
and might “participate in the negative on the will of the other
states.”39 James Madison worried that the proposed Senate’s small
size made it “more liable to be corrupted” by foreign influence than
the legislature as a whole.40
Similarly, the Federalist Papers, authored by “Publius” (a
pseudonym of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay),
contain a total of twenty-three references to corruption.41 Publius
considered “cabal, intrigue and corruption” to be the “most deadly
adversaries of Republican government.”42 And although there were
other contributing factors, Publius was “chiefly” concerned with
foreign sources of “the business of corruption.”43 Writing between
October 1787 and August 1788, “Publius . . . was concerned that the
blatant weaknesses of the central government under the Articles of
Confederation constituted a standing invitation for European powers
to meddle in American affairs.”44
Hamilton lamented that the Republic’s chief weakness was its
susceptibility to foreign corruption. Based on the lessons of the
ancient Greeks and Romans as well as the fate of European nations,
Hamilton argued the republican form of government “afford[s] too
easy an inlet to foreign corruption.”45 In Federalist 66, he explained
the concept of separation of powers as “security essentially intended
by the Constitution against corruption and treachery” like “a few
leading individuals in the Senate . . . prostitut[ing] their influence in
that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption.”46
Likewise, Madison in Federalist 41 said that “security against
Pinckney).
39. Debate on Veto of State Laws (June 8, 1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 36, at 58, 60.
40. Notes of James Madison (Aug. 17, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 314, 319 (Max Farrand ed., 1911), available at http://www.collegedefrance.fr/media/rat_soc/UPL51221_Farrand_III.pdf.
41. The Federalist Papers were a series of eighty-five essays written in support of ratifying
the Constitution.
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
43. Id. (stating corruption and related threats “might naturally have been expected to make
their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain
an improper ascendant in our councils”).
44. STEPHEN MILLER, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 66 (1983).
45. Id. at 297.
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, supra note 42, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton).
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foreign danger . . . is an avowed and essential object of the American
Union.”47 For him, the separation of powers principle was first and
foremost to keep in check “ambition or corruption.”48 In Federalist
55, Madison praised the first Congress for not being so “easily
corrupt[ed]” by “foreign gold” during the Revolution.49 He then
argued the requirement that the president and members of the Senate
“must all be American citizens” ensured that their “private
fortunes . . . cannot possibly be sources of danger.”50 Although he did
not elaborate on the argument, Madison appears to have assumed
that foreign money posed a greater danger of public corruption than
did domestic wealth.51 His fears now appear almost prophetic,
considering how many current members of Congress are heavily
invested in international markets.52
Finally, Jay in Federalist 64 uses the separation of powers
argument to counter concerns that the president and Senate might act
“corruptly” and make “disadvantageous treaties” based on “private
interests distinct from that of the nation.”53 Because a treaty must be
signed by the president and confirmed by two-thirds of the Senate,
there was no “supposable” (or at least no “probable”) danger of
foreign corruption.54 But if a treaty was ever the result of foreign
corruption, Jay posited that “the treaty so obtained from us would,
like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of
nations.”55
The result of the Federal Convention of 1787 was a new
Constitution and a new form of government informed, in many
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 42, at 295 (James Madison).
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 42, at 409 (James Madison).
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 42, at 377 (James Madison).
50. Id. at 378.
51. Id. at 379.
52. For example, several well-known members of Congress have made investments in BP
and other big oil stock. See Paul Kane & Karen Yourish, Congress Members Overseeing Firms
Involved in Gulf Spill Held Oil, Gas Stock, WASH. POST (June 17, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/16/AR2010061605369.html;
List of Congressional Members with Investments in BP, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/search_results_detail.php?filtertype=H&year=2008&org=BP&s
rchorg=BP&srchtype=O (last visited Feb. 16, 2011); David Usborne, Congress Members Have
Funds Invested in BP Stock, INDEP. (June 18, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/congress-members-have-funds-invested-in-bp-stock-2003670.html.
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 42, at 425 (John Jay).
54. Id.
55. Id.

Spring 2011]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

963

aspects, by concerns about undue foreign influence.56 For example,
the seven-years-of-residency clause57 stemmed from the delegates’
concerns about “foreigners and adventurers mak[ing] laws for us
[and] govern[ing] us.”58 Fearing that foreign principals would try to
use their wealth to influence American statesmen, the delegates also
quickly passed the nobility clause.59 Similar concerns led to the
emoluments clause,60 the incompatibility clause,61 the appointments
clause,62 the elections clause,63 the carefully crafted definition of
treason,64 the treaty-making power,65 and, of course, the requirement
of elections “by the people.”66
Shortly after the formation of the new government in 1789,
Federalists and Republicans increasingly accused each other of being
corrupted by foreign influence. As Richard Hofstadter explained,
Each party saw the other as having a foreign allegiance,
British or French, that approached the edge of treason. Each
56. I am indebted to Professor Teachout for her compilation of several of these crossreferences. See Teachout, supra note 34, at 355.
57. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2.
58. Notes of James Madison (Aug. 8, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 216; see also Notes of James Madison (Aug. 9, 1787), in
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 238 (“The men who
can shake off their attachments to their own Country can never love any other. . . . [A]dmit a
Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France: An
Englishman, he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England.” (recording the statement of
Gouverneur Morris)).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; DAVID ROBERTSON, DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 330–32 (2d ed. 1805) (1788) (recording Edmund Randolph’s
statement that the clause was plainly written “to prevent corruption” and cited as an example a
snuff box that was given to a U.S. ambassador by the king of France); see also JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., BRIBES 431 (1984) (recounting the public outcry when Benjamin Franklin received a
diamond-encrusted snuff box from the king of France as a token of appreciation).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; ROBERTSON, supra note 59, at 321–45.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; Notes of Robert Yates (June 22, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 376.
62. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; William Findley in the House of Representatives (Jan. 23,
1798), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at cclxxvii.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Notes of James Madison & Rufus King (Aug. 8–9, 1787),
in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 215–41; Notes of
James Madison (Sept. 8, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 40, at 547–53.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; Notes of Robert Yates (June 6, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 140–41; Notes of Robert Yates, supra
note 61, at 376–83.
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also saw the other as having a political aspiration or
commitment that lay outside the republican covenant of the
Constitution: the Federalists were charged with being
“Monocrats,” with aspiring to restore monarchy and the
hereditary principle; the Republicans with advocating a
radical, French-inspired democracy hostile to property and
order.67
Parting ways with Hamilton because of irreconcilable
Federalist-Republican differences, Madison accused Hamilton of
fostering, through fiscal policies he had implemented as secretary of
the treasury, “a government operating by corrupt influence.”68
Madison feared Hamilton’s anti-Republican monetary policies would
amount to a “motive of private interest in place of public duty” that
would permanently control the country.69 Madison’s fears are
supported by some credible evidence that Hamilton was trading in
foreign influence. In 1790, for example, Hamilton coached the
English ambassador on how best to negotiate a commercial treaty
between the United States and Great Britain.70 When the Jay
Treaty—named after its chief negotiator John Jay—was eventually
ratified five years later, it was not well received by the American
public. Hamilton and his followers were accused of betraying
American interests and being under the influence of the British
monarchy.71 Jay was burned in effigy throughout the country and
Hamilton was pelted with stones while trying to defend the treaty in
New York.72
Ironically, the Jay Treaty owed its existence to an unrelated
scandal involving foreign bribery. Late in 1795, George
67. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1840, at 90 (1969).
68. James Madison, Spirit of Governments, NAT’L GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1792, available at
http://www.constitution.org/jm/17920220_spirit.htm.
69. Id.
70. MILLER, supra note 44, at 73.
71. Id. A letter from James Madison to James Monroe, who was the ambassador to France at
the time, indicated Madison’s suspicion that the Jay Treaty was an attempt to increase English
influence and his anger with the state banks and chambers of commerce whom he blamed for
helping to stall the public fury against the treaty. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe
(Dec. 20, 1795), available at http://www.constitution.org/jm/17951220_monroe.htm. Madison
also suspected that many of the banks and bodies of trade were influenced by British capitalists.
See id.
72. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 71.
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Washington’s administration learned that Secretary of State Edmund
Rudolph had served as a conduit for French bribes to American
politicians.73 Despite some reservations, President Washington
decided to sign the Jay Treaty with Britain in an effort to counter
French influence that he feared had reached the highest levels of the
U.S. government.74 Initially, the French continued to exert
considerable influence on American politics with the help of pro–
French Republicans such as James Monroe, who was appointed by
Washington as ambassador to France during that time.75 But by 1797
the Jay Treaty had bolstered the American economy, and most
Americans had turned against France for its incessant interference in
American politics.76
During the Quasi-War with France,77 Congress sought to further
reduce French influence by passing the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798.78 This series of laws included the Naturalization Act, which
extended the residency requirement for aliens to become citizens to
fourteen years; the Alien Friends Act, which authorized the President
to deport any resident alien deemed to be a danger to the “peace and
safety”79 of the United States; the Alien Enemies Act, which
authorized deportation of any resident alien whose home country was
at war with the United States; and the Sedition Act, which made it a
crime to publish “false, scandalous and malicious” writings against
the government or its officials.80 The Sedition Act was the most
controversial of the four laws,81 but the Supreme Court never directly
73. MILLER, supra note 44, at 73.
74. Id. Madison, in writing to Monroe, indicated that Washington had been advised against
signing the treaty. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 71.
75. See MILLER, supra note 44, at 73.
76. Id.
77. See The Reestablishment of the Navy, 1787–1801, NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER,
http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm (last visited June 15, 2011). Fought
between 1798 and 1800, the Quasi-War was an undeclared maritime conflict between the United
States and France. Id.
78. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were actually four separate laws: An Act to
Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); An Act Concerning
Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798);
An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596
(1798).
79. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570.
80. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 74, 1 Stat.
596.
81. See Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien and Sedition Acts (Dec. 21, 1798), available
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decided its constitutionality because it expired on March 3, 1801.82
2. The Rise of and Response to Foreign Corporate Influence
Despite the fact that only six corporations existed in the early
Republic,83 Jefferson and Madison greatly feared all factions,
including corporations, and sought to limit their power.84 In colonial
America most states prohibited corporations from engaging in any
activities not specified in their charters (known as the ultra vires
doctrine), including owning property not directly related to those
authorized activities.85 Foreign trading companies established the
Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Virginia, and Carolina colonies, and
their charters restricted each colony to trading exclusively with its
respective foreign parent company.86 For example, both the Dutch
West India Company and the Hudson Bay Company enjoyed a
monopoly over trade in their respective areas, which prevented the
colonists from dealing with the local Native Americans and nonsponsoring countries.87 The colonists viewed such restrictions on free
trade as exerting undue foreign influence over their way of life and
eventually began to reject the charters. Most notably, the Sons of
Liberty in Massachusetts strongly opposed English attempts to force
the colonies to do business with the East India Company. Their
at http://www.constitution.org/jm/17981221_virres.htm. The State Assembly of Virginia publicly
condemned the Act as an intrusion by the federal government on the rights of people to free press
and speech. Id.
82. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (“Although the Sedition Act
was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of
history.” (footnote omitted)). Subsequently, Congress passed other laws to control participation
by non-citizens in the American political process. See also Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 310 (2006)) (restricting alien ownership of a
broadcasting license); Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163,
182–88 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (1994)) (excluding communists from the
U.S.); Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 1006–13 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 831–835 (1994)); Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, 1221–22 (repealed 1907
and 1917) (forbidding the admission of anarchists to the United States).
83. Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus
Jurisprudence To Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 526 (2010).
84. Id. at 526–28.
85. Id. at 532.
86. GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12–13 (1918).
87. Id. (explaining the charters generally gave the companies the exclusive power to make
treaties with the Native Americans and the power to enforce these trading rights through the use
of arms).
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efforts led to the Boston Tea Party and ultimately to the American
Revolution.88
After the Civil War, corporations grew significantly more
powerful. New Jersey was the first state to change its corporate
charters to permit free incorporation.89 The Garden State was quickly
followed by Delaware, New York, and other states abandoning the
grant theory of incorporation90 and joining in the race to the bottom.91
These changes gave rise not only to hundreds of new corporations
but also to tremendous increases in corporate revenue.92 As these
corporations became wealthier, they increased their spending in
federal, state, and local elections to further their own interests.93 In
fact, state legislative efforts to bar corporate campaign contributions
began in the 1890s, in tandem with the rise of corporate spending in
elections.94
To stem this free flow of corporate political money, Congress
passed the Tillman Act of 1907.95 As the first major federal campaign
finance law, its primary purpose was to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption by corporations.96 The Tillman Act banned
all direct corporate contributions in connection with any federal or
state election.97 Although it provided for civil and criminal fines and

88. EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 204 (2d ed. 1988).
89. HENDERSON, supra note 86, at 32–33.
90. The “grant theory of incorporation” viewed the corporation as an artificial entity “that
owed its existence to the state, with its powers limited by its charter of incorporation.” Rubin,
supra note 83, at 535. In contrast, modern incorporation statutes permit the formation of a
company without having to first seek specific legislative permission.
91. Id. at 538.
92. See LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS, POLITICS AND PEOPLE: THE ORDEAL
OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 294 (1932).
93. See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance
After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 646 (2011).
94. Id. By 1905, five states had barred corporate campaign contributions, and by 1928 that
number had grown to twenty-seven. Id.
95. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864. The legislative history suggests
two distinct rationales for the Act: “preventing corrupt practices acts” and preventing directors
from using shareholders’ money without consent. H.R. REP. NO. 59-6397, at 1–2 (1907).
96. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003) (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)).
97. The Tillman Act provided, “[t]hat it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any
corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in
connection with any election to any political office.” Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34
Stat. 864
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even imprisonment,98 the statute had three fundamental
shortcomings. First, it contained no disclosure requirements, so
enforcement was virtually impossible.99 Second, employers could
reimburse corporate directors for making “personal” contributions.100
Lastly, the Tillman Act only covered general elections, not
primaries.101 In 1910, Congress enacted the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act (also known as the Publicity Act) to remedy the Tillman Act’s
deficiencies.102
In 1938 Congress enacted the Foreign Agent Registration Act
(FARA) because of growing concerns about foreign influence over
U.S. policy-making.103 A House Un-American Activities Committee
initiative, FARA established disclosure requirements for certain
kinds of political expression sponsored by foreign principals but did
not place any restrictions on the speech itself. Initially, all “agents”
of “foreign principals” in the United States were required to register
with the federal government.104 Congress intended this to prevent
foreign efforts “to influence the external and internal policies of this
country, thereby violating both the letter and the spirit of
international law, as well as the democratic basis of our own
American institutions of government.”105 During World War II,
Congress amended FARA to require foreign agents to place a written
disclosure statement on all political propaganda and to provide the
government with a detailed dissemination report including at least
two copies of the propaganda material within forty-eight hours of
98. The Tillman Act required that violators, “be punished by a fine of not exceeding one
thousand and not less than two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for a term of not
more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.” Id. at 865.
99. See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance
Law, in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 13 (2005) (stating that even after the
Tillman Act’s passage, the NPLO continued to call for disclosure of party campaign receipts and
expenditures so that voters would know which interests were financing which campaigns).
100. See Justin A. Nelson, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 524, 534 (2000).
101. Id.
102. Publicity Act of 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (repealed 1972); see also Nelson, supra note
100, at 534 (describing the “limited” effects of both the Publicity Act and Congress’s subsequent
attempts at more stringent modifications to it in 1911).
103. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) (current version at
22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2006)).
104. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). FARA defines an “agent of a foreign principal” as “any person
who acts . . . under the direction or control, of a foreign principal . . . .” Id.
105. H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 1–3 (1937).

Spring 2011]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

969

any publication.106 Congress intended these 1942 amendments to
limit foreign involvement in U.S. politics because of the “vast
amount of propaganda which the Axis powers sent into this country
during World War II.”107 FARA enabled the federal government to
evaluate and subject to public scrutiny the “un-American activities”
of foreign agents trying to establish a “foreign system of
government” in this country.108 Portions of FARA, as amended, are
still in effect today.109
In 1943, Congress passed the Smith-Connally Act prohibiting
corporations and unions from making campaign contributions in
federal elections for the duration of the war.110 Congress later passed
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which permanently banned any
corporate or union contributions or expenditures relating to any
federal primary, nominating convention, or general election.111
According to the Court in United States v. UAW-CIO,112 Congress
intended for the Taft-Hartley Act “to protect the political process
from what it deemed to be the corroding effect of money employed
in elections by aggregated power.”113 Congressional fear of foreign
106. 22 U.S.C. § 614(a)–(b); see Canadian Films and the Foreign Agents Registration Act:
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. of the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 76–77 (1983) (statement of Mr. Edwards, and pursuant to his request,
adoption of the dissemination report as a part of the record); Amending Act Requiring
Registration of Foreign Agents: Hearings on H.R. 6045 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. (1941).
107. Robert G. Waters, Note, The Foreign Registration Act: How Open Should the
Marketplace of Ideas Be?, 53 MO. L. REV. 795, 799 (1988) (providing additional legislative
history); see also Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participation of Non-Citizens in the U.S.
Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 509 (1997) (summarizing the
Fulbright hearings); Rodney A. Smolla & Stephen A. Smith, Propaganda, Xenophobia, and the
First Amendment, 67 OR. L. REV. 253, 267 (1988) (noting that propaganda was one of the reasons
that FARA was amended in 1967).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2.
109. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691. Under this Act,
foreign agents representing foreign individuals, corporations, partnerships, and associations are
allowed to provide less information than agents of foreign governments and political parties. Id.
§ 9; see also Foreign Agents Registration Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.fara.gov/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2011) (providing a current overview of FARA).
110. Smith-Connally Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163, 167–68 (1943) (terminated 1946); see also
Corrado, supra note 99, at 17 (explaining the Act was only adopted as a wartime measure, and as
such was due to expire after six months).
111. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). Informally
known as the Taft-Hartley Act, the law was first codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1946) and then
later, as amended, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–166 (2006).
112. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
113. Id. at 582.
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influence was evident from language in the Taft-Hartley Act denying
certification to any labor organization with officers tied to the
Communist Party or who promoted communist ideas.114
The 1950s brought the treason-by-propaganda cases.115 These
cases involved individuals who had colluded with Nazi Germany to
produce propaganda to demoralize the American troops and people.
The decisions in these cases emphasized that simple words or actions
indicating disagreement or criticism of the United States were not
enough to sustain a conviction for treason.116 The First Circuit Court
of Appeals, for example, required proof that the defendant intended
to betray the nation, such as an overt act of coordination with the
enemy.117 Being employed by the enemy as a propagandist, however,
was enough for an individual to be prosecuted for treason.118 The
Supreme Court vigorously opposed easing the standards for proving
treason, but it acknowledged that the government had a legitimate
interest in protecting national security when threatened by
individuals who coordinate their actions with a foreign entity.119
In 1966, Congress strengthened its restrictions on foreigncontrolled political activities by amending FARA to make it a felony
for a foreign principal to use an agent to make campaign
contributions or for a candidate to solicit such contributions.120 In
114. H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 20–21 (1947) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1135, 1154–55 (stating that it should be remembered that in 1947, the nation was only a couple of
years removed from World War II and now found itself facing the threat of the Soviet Union and
the potential spread of communism).
115. See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (stating that multiple
witnesses testified that Gillars used speech with the intent of betraying American interests in
favor of Germany); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1948) (stating that Cramer had
been known to associate with Nazi sympathizers and had made remarks that were critical of the
U.S. government but had not committed acts that demonstrated an outright intent to betray the
United States in favor of Germany).
116. The Supreme Court in Cramer ruled there was insufficient evidence to convict, arguing
that the Founders had intended for the term overt act to indicate a blatant demonstration of
treasonous intent against the U.S. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45.
117. See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 929 (1st Cir. 1948).
118. See United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1954); D’Aquino v. United
States, 192 F.2d 338, 349 (9th Cir. 1951); Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C.
Cir. 1951); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 137–38 (1st Cir. 1950).
119. See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45–48. In its ruling the Court made it clear that it was not
opposed to the U.S. government protecting its interests; it even acknowledged that certain
coordination with foreign entities could present a threat. It simply declared that treason is an
extremely volatile tool that should not be wielded lightly and urged the government to pursue
other avenues in protecting itself against foreign influence. Id.
120. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 248–49 (1966)

Spring 2011]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

971

particular, Congress designed these 1966 amendments to reach “the
lawyer-lobbyist and the public relations counsel whose object [was]
not to subvert or overthrow the U.S. Government, but to influence its
policies to the satisfaction of the particular client.”121 Unfortunately,
even as amended, FARA focused exclusively on foreign principals’
agents rather than the principals themselves.122 This created a glaring
“agents-only” loophole that foreign corporations generously
exploited.123
3. Modern Political Scandals Involving Foreign Corporations
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)124 ushered
in the modern era of federal campaign finance law. Congress passed
FECA primarily out of concern that wealthy candidates could use
family money to gain an unfair advantage in a campaign.125 FECA’s
passage was also motivated by general concerns about the rising cost
of elections.126 In 1974, however, Congress amended FECA to close
the loophole in FARA that had permitted foreign nationals and
corporations to provide campaign funds directly to candidates.127
(current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006)). See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1470, at 2–4 [hereinafter
HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2397–99.
121. Waters, supra note 107, at 800. For example, major clients included Philippine sugar
manufacturers who wished to influence legislation concerning sugar import quotas. Jeffrey K.
Powell, Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions from Foreign Sources: Questioning Their
Justification in a Global Independent Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 957, 960 (1996).
122. See 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) (corresponds to 80 Stat. 244, 244) (2006) (defining the “agent of
a foreign principal” as any person who acts “under the direction or control, of a foreign principal
or of a person . . . directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in
whole or in major part by a foreign principal”). Business associations that are organized in the
U.S. are not classified as foreign principals. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)(2).
123. Senator Bentsen later noted this when pressing for the extension of the ban to cover all
foreign nationals: “The law is ambiguous and confusing . . . . Congress thought it had taken care
of the matter long ago but the Department of Justice said that the law . . . only applies to those
who had agents within this country.” 120 CONG. REC. S4714 (1974). The exploitation of the
loophole became all too obvious during the investigation of the scandals that plagued the Nixon
administration. See Martin Tolchin, Foreign Role in U.S. Politics Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1986, at B7.
124. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455
(2006)). The bill went into effect on April 7, 1972. Bryan R. Whittaker, A Legislative Strategy
Conditioned on Corruption: Regulating Campaign Financing After McConnell v. FEC, 79 IND.
L.J. 1063, 1068–69 (2004).
125. See SUZANNE M. COIL, CAMPAIGN FINANCING 10 (1994).
126. See id. at 12. Ironically, some of these concerns came from members of Congress who
were worried that they might not be able to afford the rising costs of campaigning. See Whittaker,
supra note 124, at 1068–69.
127. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
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Although FARA had been abused in this manner for almost a decade,
the American public was largely unaware of the law’s giant loophole
until the Watergate scandal.128
During the investigation of that scandal, it was revealed that
President Nixon, in his 1972 presidential election campaign, had
accepted well over $10 million in overseas donations.129 In response,
Senator Lloyd Bentsen proposed an amendment to FECA (“the
Bentsen Amendment”) that would bar all foreign nationals, except
permanent resident aliens (PRAs), from making any campaign
contributions in federal, state, or local elections.130 It also banned
(1974). Congressional concerns about the rise of foreign influence within domestic corporations
are further evidenced by the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). See
Pub. L. 95-213, §§ 101–04, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494–98 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-1–3). It prohibits U.S. individuals and corporations from paying bribes or anything of
value to a foreign government official. Id. Among other things, the FCPA prohibits U.S.
companies from making political contributions overseas. Id. The assumption is U.S. domestic law
is sufficient to address any bribery here in the United States. However, the Domestic and Foreign
Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977 includes provisions mandating that anyone who
acquires or attempts to acquire shares of U.S. domestic securities or interests is required to notify
the Securities and Exchange Commission of his or her residence and nationality. Pub. L. No. 95213, §§ 201–04, 91 Stat. 1494, 1298–300 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note,
78m, 78o).
128. See generally John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 645–
49 (2000) (discussing the details of the Watergate scandal).
129. See Powell, supra note 121, at 961 n.21. The Watergate scandal involved almost $20
million dollars in unreported, corporate campaign contributions. For example, the Amerada Hess
Corporation made secret donations of more than $575,000 to the campaigns of President Nixon
and Senator Henry Jackson (Chair of the Interior Committee). A short time later, the Department
of Interior dropped an investigation into one of the company’s oil refineries. See Senate Panel
Data Show Donor Hid Gifts to Jackson’s ‘72 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1974, at B25. There
were many other reported stories of the money being used for corrupt, illegal purposes. See
ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 47 (1988). Perhaps most famously, two Washington Post reporters,
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, broke the story that some of the illegal corporate money had
been laundered through a Mexico City bank and used to pay the men who bugged and burglarized
Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate hotel-apartment building. Id. In
addition to the money laundering through Mexico banks, Nixon allegedly received $1.5 million
from the Shah of Iran, approximately $10 million from Arab interests, and $2 million from a
wealthy French man named Paul Louis Weiller. Powell, supra note 121, at 961 n.20. But see
MAURICE H. STANS, THE TERRORS OF JUSTICE 182–84 (1978) (denying that Nixon’s campaign
committee actually received these funds and arguing that such allegations were false).
130. Martin Tolchin, Foreign Role in U.S. Politics Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1986, at
B7. The law was first adopted in 1976 as an amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act
and was later recodified at Section 441e. See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006). The term “foreign national”
included any “foreign principal,” as defined in FARA, as well as any individual who is neither a
U.S. citizen nor a permanent resident of the United States. 120 CONG. REC. 8782 (1974). The
definition proposed by the U.S. General Accounting Office further included any corporation (or
other group or organization) that was not created under the laws of the U.S. or that did not
maintain its principle place of business with in the U.S. Id.; Daniel S. Savrin, Note, Curtailing
Foreign Financial Participation in Domestic Elections: A Proposal to Reform the Federal
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candidates from soliciting or accepting funds from foreign
nationals.131 Other FECA amendments were also proposed in 1974,
including one establishing the FEC.132 During the Senate debates on
the 1974 amendments, Bentsen convincingly argued that foreign
principals do not have “any business in our political campaigns.
They cannot vote in our elections so why should we allow them to
finance our elections? Their loyalties lie elsewhere; they lie with
their own countries and their own governments.”133 The Bentsen
Amendment passed as part of the 1974 amendments.134 However, it
was not until 1976 that Congress granted the FEC jurisdiction to
implement and enforce the Bentsen Amendment, which was
eventually codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441e.135
In 1989, the FEC issued rules extending the prohibition on
contributions to, among other things, independent expenditures by
foreign nationals.136 The FEC also formalized its official position that
Election Campaign Act, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 783, 794 n.41 (1988) (discussing the legislative
history of 2 U.S.C. § 441e).
131. 120 CONG. REC. 8782.
132. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263.
133. 120 CONG. REC. 8783. Senator Bentsen repeatedly expressed his concern over
stories . . . in recent months of the enormous amounts of money contributed in the last
political campaign by foreign nationals. We have heard of the hundreds of thousands of
dollars sloshing around from one country to another, going through foreign banks,
being laundered through foreign banks; and we have heard allegations of concessions
being made by the Government to foreign contributors.
120 CONG. REC. 8782. He added,
Many in this country have expressed concern over the inroads of foreign investment in
this country, over the attempts by foreigners to control U.S. business. Is it not even
more important to try to stop some of these foreigners from trying to control our
politics? . . . American political campaigns should be for Americans . . . .
120 CONG. REC. 8783. Bentsen intended his amendment to limit the “privilege to contribute
[campaign funds in American political campaigns] . . . to U.S. citizens and to those who have
indicated their intention to live here, are here legally, and are permanent residents.” 120 CONG.
REC. 8784.
134. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974). The Amendment was passed by a unanimous vote of 89-0. 120 CONG. REC. 8786.
However, until the 1976 Amendments placed the ban under the jurisdiction of the FEC, the
Bentsen Amendment would have been considered an amendment to the criminal code. See 18
U.S.C. § 613 (repealed 1976).
135. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112(2),
90 Stat. 475, 484–95 (1976) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006)) (adding the
prohibition on foreign contributions as section 324 of FECA); see also Savrin, supra note 130, at
794–95 (discussing the FEC’s role in administering the Bentsen Amendment).
136. See Brown, supra note 107, at 503 n.48 (citing Restrictions on Foreign Nationals
Extended, reprinted in 4 FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 9276 (Nov. 17, 1989)); see
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a foreign national with control or ownership of a domestic subsidiary
could not make decisions with regard to that subsidiary’s
participation in the U.S. political process.137 This quickly devolved
into the regulatory loophole for foreign-controlled and foreignowned domestic corporations that Congress and the courts find
themselves confronting today.138
In 1996, another scandal involving foreign corporate campaign
spending arose. That year the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) received several large contributions from PRAs with foreign
business connections. The controversy regarding these donations
caused the DNC to return millions of dollars in questionable
contributions, but not before allegations surfaced that foreign
governments, including China’s, may have attempted to funnel
money to the Democratic party.139 In response, Senators John
McCain and Russell Feingold introduced a bill that would have
barred PRAs from making contributions in federal elections.140
Related bills were introduced in the House, and President Clinton
endorsed the idea in his State of the Union address.141 Although the
bill changed dramatically before it passed,142 eventually the McCainFeingold Act was signed into law as the Bipartisan Campaign
also 2 U.S.C. § 431(17); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.16, 109.1 (2010).
137. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i) (“A foreign national shall not direct, dictate, control, or
directly or indirectly participate in the decision-making process of any person, such as a
corporation, labor organization, political committee, or political organization with regard to such
person’s Federal or non-Federal election-related activities, such as decisions concerning the
making of contributions, donations, expenditures, or disbursements in connection with elections
for any Federal, State, or local office or decisions concerning the administration of a political
committee.”); see also Brown, supra note 107, at 513–14.
138. See 29 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2–3 (1989) (deducing that a corporation organized
under U.S. laws was exempt from the ban on foreigners even if it was a subsidiary of a foreign
parent and could create a SSF for contribution purposes, provided its foreign owners did not fund
or participate in the decision-making concerning the SSF). But see 29 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n
Dissent 5–6 (arguing that the Commission’s separation of the domestic subsidiary and its foreign
parent into two entities was an error). The problem created by this ruling came to fruition in the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United. See infra text accompanying notes 159–61.
139. See Brown, supra note 107, at 505–06.
140. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS THOMAS, Bill Summary & Status 107th Congress (2001–
2002) S.27, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:S.27: (last visited June 15, 2011).
141. Brown, supra note 107, at 507.
142. In fact, it is ironic that the law is still commonly referred to as the McCain-Feingold Act
because the Senate version is not the bill that became law. Instead, the companion legislation,
H.R. 2356—introduced by Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Connecticut)—is the version that became
law. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). ShaysMeehan was originally introduced as H.R. 380.
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Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).143 Among other things, section 303 of
the BCRA amended FECA to expand the ban on campaign
contributions from foreign nationals and foreign-based groups to
include donations, expenditures, independent expenditures,
disbursements for electioneering communications, and contributions
or donations to any political party committee.144 Since its passage, the
BCRA has faced a series of legal challenges before the Supreme
Court.145
B. Current Campaign Finance Laws Covering
Foreign-Controlled Corporate Political Spending
Corporate campaign financing is currently governed by section
203 of the BCRA (“Section 203”), which continues to be more
commonly referred to as the McCain-Feingold Act.146 Among other
things, Section 203 prohibits corporations from making campaign
contributions out of their general treasury funds in connection with
federal elections and also imposes various disclosure requirements.147
Until Citizens United, Section 203 also prohibited all corporations—
including nonprofit advocacy groups—from making independent
expenditures expressly advocating candidates’ election or defeat and
from engaging in electioneering communication.148 An electioneering
143. Id.
144. Id. § 303.
145. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449
(2007); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
146. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 203.
147. The McCain-Feingold Act extended disclosure requirements to the national committees,
national congressional campaign committees of political parties, and any other political
committees with receipts and disbursements aggregating $5000; local and state parties were
included as well to force disclosure of soft-money use. See id. § 103. The McCain-Feingold Act
also tightened down disclosure requirements for electioneering communications by requiring
those who spent $10,000 or more on electioneering communications to file a report containing the
identity of the financier, his place of occupation, the identity of the person who helped contribute
to the communication’s creation, and whether or not the person was a foreign national; such
reports had to be filed within twenty-four hours of a disclosure date. See id. § 201. Strict
disclosure requirements for independent expenditures were also put in place; for example, anyone
who made an independent expenditure of $1000 or more in less than twenty days but more than
twenty-four hours before an election would be required to report the expenditure within twentyfour hours of having made it. See id. § 212.
148. Unless the corporation is federally chartered or a national bank, these limits under 2
U.S.C. § 441b only apply in federal elections, not state or local elections. Anthony Corrado,
Introduction to Party Soft Money, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 167, 169 (1997).
Additionally, corporations—including American subsidiaries of foreign corporations—were and
still are permitted, because of a loophole in the laws, to make unlimited soft-money donations to
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communication is defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office” and is made within thirty days of a primary election
or sixty days before a general election.149 In 2010, however, the
Supreme Court in Citizens United struck down Section 203’s ban on
corporate independent expenditures, including the blackout periods
imposed on electioneering communications.150 This decision
overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,151and
partially overturned McConnell v. FEC,152 both of which had
previously upheld the ban.153 However, Section 203’s limits on
corporate contributions remain intact.154 In addition, the Court upheld
and even encouraged a possible expansion of the BCRA’s disclosure
requirements.155
FECA subjects foreign corporations to additional restrictions,
which are codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441e.156 It bars all “foreign
nationals” except PRAs from making any contributions in connection
with a federal, state, or local election.157 Section 441e, as interpreted
by the FEC and as later amended by the BCRA, also bans foreign
nationals from making any independent expenditures or

national political parties and 527 groups for nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote drives
or issue ads. See id. at 167–77. But foreign-controlled subsidiaries are only permitted to donate
money earned in the United States. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 101.
149. Id. § 201. Section 203 bans electioneering communications funded by corporations. See
29 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 3 (1989). This provision may have unintentionally encouraged the
proliferation of negative ads by permitting issue advocacy ads that did not expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a particular candidate. See Corrado, supra note 99, at 32–33.
150. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). The Citizens United decision is also likely to affect laws in
twenty-four states that currently prohibit or restrict corporate spending on candidate elections.
Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607. These state laws will have to be revised to
comport with this new standard. See id.
151. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
152. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
153. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. The Court then declared its return to the Belotti
mindset that corporations cannot be banned from political speech simply because they are
corporations. Id. See generally infra text accompanying notes 202–08 (providing further
background on Austin and McConnell).
154. Id. at 901–02.
155. Id. at 914–17.
156. Campaign finance regulations currently impose “unique and complex rules” on “71
distinct entities.” Id. at 895. These entities are subject to separate rules for thirty-three different
types of political speech. Id.
157. 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
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disbursements for electioneering communications.158 The definition
of “foreign national” includes any corporation that was not created
under U.S. law or that does not maintain its principal place of
business in the United States.159 Based on this definition, the FEC has
interpreted Section 441e to exempt foreign-controlled or foreignowned domestic corporations.160 After Citizens United, this
interpretation means foreign corporations’ American subsidiaries
may make unlimited independent expenditures, including those for
electioneering communications.161 They may also establish,
administer, and solicit funds for PACs,162 which are subject to
contribution limits but have always been exempt from the ban on
independent expenditures.163
However,
foreign-controlled
domestic
corporations’
independent expenditures are not free from regulation. For example,
foreign-controlled domestic corporations can only use monies earned
in the United States for their political activities directed here.164 A
foreign parent entity cannot provide any of the funds, and it may not
158. Id. § 441e(a)(1)(C).
159. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (2006). It also includes foreign governments, political parties and
individuals without permanent resident status. Id. § 611(a).
160. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2010); see also 29 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2–3 (1989)
(“Under U.S.C. § 611(b), a corporation organized under the law [of] any state within the United
States whose principal place of business is within the United States is not a foreign principal and,
accordingly, would not be a foreign national under 2 U.S.C. § 441e.”). Since 1975 the FEC has
issued over 568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of explanations for those regulations, and 1,771
advisory opinions. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 895.
161. See Louis Jacobson, Why Alito Shook His Head: Obama Exaggerates Impact of Supreme
Court Ruling on Foreign Companies, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:56 PM),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/jan/27/barack-obama/obama-sayssupreme-court-ruling-allows-foreign-com/. Corporations previously gave soft money to national
political parties earmarked for get-out-the-vote efforts and other nonpartisan activities to get
around the limits on independent expenditures. After Citizens United, this has become
unnecessary.
162. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). The regulations refer to PACs as “separated segregated funds”
(SSFs). Id. In 1996, close to 100 foreign-controlled PACs actively supported U.S. political
campaigns. Today more than 140 PACs with foreign connections do. See Foreign-Connected
PACs, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/foreign.php?cycle=
2008 (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
163. PACs are committees organized for the purpose of raising and spending money in order
to elect or defeat certain candidates, but PACs have their own natural dollar limits based on the
disposable income of their individual members. See What Is A PAC?, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
164. See 29 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2–3 (1995). This stems from the FEC’s mandate that
PAC members consist only of U.S. citizens and PRAs and that a PAC solicit its donations from
only those members. See 15 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2–4 (1995).
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“replenish all or any portion of the subsidiary’s political
contributions.”165 In fact, a foreign national cannot have any decisionmaking role regarding the domestic corporation’s political
contributions or expenditures.166
Likewise, foreign parent PACs have to be funded exclusively by
money provided by U.S. citizens and permanent residents associated
with the sponsoring corporation, such as stockholders and
employees.167 According to various FEC advisory opinions, PACs
cannot accept contributions from foreign nationals, and no foreign
national may be involved in the administration of the fund or in any
decisions regarding how the fund’s money should be spent.168 The
foreign parent may not even pay for a PAC fund’s administrative
costs.169
C. Recent Congressional Proposals to Prevent Foreign Influence
In the past, the FEC has invited Congress to review its decisions
concerning foreign financial participation in U.S. elections to ensure
that the FEC resolved the policy questions correctly.170 Although the
legislative history and strong dissents by some FEC members
suggest that the FEC has gotten it wrong some of the time,171
Congress has repeatedly declined to undo the FEC’s most
controversial rulings. The Supreme Court’s controversial decision in
Citizens United, however, appears to have upended this balance. All
of the Framers’ fears of foreign influence on the American political
165. Powell, supra note 121, at 966 n.63.
166. See Brown, supra note 107, at 514 n.52.
167. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
168. See 17 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 6–8 (2000).
169. See id. at 8.
170. See Savrin, supra note 130, at 807.
171. For example, the FEC ruled that domestic subsidies of foreign corporations could
contribute to elections through PACs so long as there was no foreign involvement in the funding
and administration of the PAC. 17 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 6–10 (2000). The FEC also ruled
that foreign nationals may work or perform services for campaigns so long as there are not any
finances involved. 25 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n. 1–2 (1987). These rulings were inconsistent
with congressional intent. Senator Bentsen said, “I do not think that foreign nationals have any
business in our political campaigns.” 120 Cong. Rec. 8783. Bentsen reasoned that foreigners are
not loyal to this country; therefore, they should not be allowed to financially participate in the
selection of a government to represent and carry out the nation’s interests. Id. For this reason,
several commissioners dissented from the FEC advisory opinions. See 17 Op. Fed. Election
Comm’n Dissent 1 (2000); 28 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n Dissent 1 (1999); 16 Op. Fed. Election
Comm’n Dissent 1 (1992); 29 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n Dissent 1 (1989).
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process have resurfaced, prompting several congresspersons to offer
new reform bills as the cure.172
The Obama administration maintains that Citizens United
opened the floodgates for political spending not only by U.S.
corporations but more particularly by foreign corporations’ U.S.
subsidiaries. In his State of the Union address, Obama criticized the
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, declaring:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week
the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe
will open the floodgates for special interests—including
foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our
elections. I don’t think American elections should be
bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests, or worse,
by foreign entities.173
While the Citizens United decision avoided striking down the
existing ban on foreign political money, its elimination of the
blackout period on corporate electioneering has significantly
widened the door for foreign-controlled or foreign-owned domestic
corporations to exploit the administrative loophole created by the
FEC’s interpretation of Section 441e. In response, several members
of Congress have stepped forward to challenge the FEC’s
interpretation of Section 441e as a whole.174
The campaign finance reform bills introduced in the 111th
Congress addressed the issue of foreign influence on U.S. politics in
a variety of ways. A majority of the proposed bills would have
172. See Democrats Move to Blunt Citizens United Ruling, POLITICO (Apr. 24, 2010,
11:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/36303.html.
173. President Barack Obama, 2010 State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010). These
remarks prompted Justice Samuel Alito to frown and mouth the words “not true.” Alan Silverleib,
Gloves Come Off After Obama Rips Supreme Court Ruling, CNN (Jan. 28, 2010, 1:26 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/01/28/alito.obama.sotu/index.html?iref=allsearch.
174. See 156 CONG. REC. S531 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2010) (statement by Sen. Leahy) (“The
court’s ruling exacerbates the already existing loophole allowing campaign contributions from
American subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Today, an American subsidiary of a multinational
corporation is treated as an American corporation under the campaign finance laws. . . . How will
the Federal Elections Commission be able to police whether the actual source of a campaign
contribution comes solely from the domestic entity, and not its foreign affiliations? When a
multinational corporation funds a political advertisement, is the FEC expected to audit the foreign
and domestic sides of the corporation, to ensure that the source of the contribution came purely
from the U.S. subsidiary? How can the FEC ensure that American subsidiaries of foreign
corporations do not become a front for foreign interests who want to influence American
elections?” (emphasis added)).
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extended the ban on foreign nationals to any domestic corporation in
which one or more foreign nationals had any ownership interest
whatsoever.175 Other bills would have extended the ban to domestic
corporations in which foreign nationals own at least half of the
voting shares.176 A few bills would have extended the ban based on
smaller percentages of ownership by foreign nationals.177 At least one
bill would have prohibited corporations that are considered foreignowned from having PACs that could spend money on elections.178
The common thread among all of these proposals was that they
would have limited foreign-controlled and foreign-owned domestic
corporations’ influence on the U.S. political process.
The House passed one of the proposed reform bills, known as
the DISCLOSE (Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On
Spending in Elections) Act, on June 21, 2010, but it failed twice to
pass in the Senate.179 Obama called the Senate’s inaction “a victory
for special interests and U.S. corporations—including foreign175. See America Is for Americans Act, H.R. 4510, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (proposing to
amend Section 441e to include corporations in which a foreign national possesses a direct or
indirect ownership interest) (introduced by Rep. Alan Grayson); Prohibiting Foreign Influence in
American Elections Act, H.R. 4522, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (containing amendment language
identical to that of H.R. 4510) (introduced by Rep. Bill Pascrell Jr.); Save Our Democracy from
Foreign Influence Act of 2010, H.R. 4523, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (proposing to amend Section
441e to include corporations with one or more foreign nationals as shareholders) (introduced by
Rep. Thomas Periello); Prohibiting Foreign Influence in American Elections Act, S. 2954, 111th
Cong. § 2 (2010) (containing language identical to H.R. 4510 and H.R. 4522) (introduced by Sen.
Robert Menendez).
176. See Prevent Foreign Influence in our Elections Act, H.R. 4540, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010)
(proposing to amend the language of Section 441e to include corporations that have 50 percent or
more of their outstanding shares controlled directly or indirectly owned by foreign nationals)
(introduced by Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro); Ethics in Foreign Lobbying Act of 2009, H.R. 3859,
111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposing to extend the ban on foreign contributions and expenditures to
the PACs of corporations in which foreign nationals hold 50 percent or more of the ownership
interests) (introduced by Rep. Marcy Kaptur).
177. See American Elections Act of 2010, S. 2959, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing to extend
the ban to corporations with 20 percent of their voting shares or a majority of their board of
directors controlled by foreign nationals) (introduced by Sen. Al Franken); Freedom from
Foreign-Based Manipulation in American Elections Act of 2010, H.R. 4517, 111th Cong. (2010)
(proposing to extend the ban on contributions and expenditures by foreign nationals to domestic
corporations if they have 5 percent or more of their outstanding shares owned by foreign
principals, or if a foreign national sits on the board of directors, or if one or more foreign
nationals is employed in a senior executive position, and severely increasing the monetary
penalties for violations) (introduced by Rep. John J. Hall).
178. See H.R. 3859 (proposing to extend the ban on foreign contributions and expenditures to
the PACs of corporations in which foreign nationals hold 50 percent or more of the ownership
interests) (introduced by Rep. Marcy Kaptur).
179. The bill failed to achieve cloture on July 28, 2010, and again on September 23, 2010, by
one vote short of the sixty votes needed to reach the Senate floor for action.
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controlled ones—who are now allowed to spend unlimited money to
fill our airwaves, mailboxes and phone lines right up until election
day.”180 Among other things, the DISCLOSE Act would have
extended the ban on contributions and expenditures by foreignowned and foreign-controlled domestic corporations and their
PACs.181 Under the bill, a domestic corporation would have been
deemed ineligible to participate in the funding of the U.S. political
process if 5 percent or more of its voting shares were controlled by a
foreign government, a foreign government official, or a corporation
principally owned by a foreign government or its officials or by
multiple foreign citizens.182 A domestic corporation would also have
been considered ineligible if 20 percent or more of its voting shares
were owned or controlled by a foreign citizen who is not a
government official. The ban would also have extended to domestic
corporations that have foreign nationals serving as a majority of their
board of directors.183 At the start of the 112th Congress Senate
majority leader Harry Reid made the DISCLOSE Act one of his top
priorities by filling one of the first ten legislative slots of the new
Congress with the Political Reform and Gridlock Elimination Act
(S.9), which “expresses the sense of the Senate that Congress should
pass the DISCLOSE Act to prevent a corporate takeover of our
elections and ensure that our democracy is open, transparent, and
controlled by the people.”184 Regardless of Congress’s intentions, the
constitutional question remains whether foreign-controlled and
foreign-owned American corporations have First Amendment rights,
and if they do, whether and to what extent Congress may
constitutionally restrict their freedom of speech and association
180. Michael A. Memoli, Disclose Act Fails to Advance in Senate, L.A TIMES, Sept. 24,
2010, at A2.
181. See DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 201 (2010). The bill also imposed
enhanced disclaimers in advertising, stricter disclosure rules to allow shareholders and the public
to know where the corporate money was going, and tightened coordination rules to prevent
corporations from “sponsoring” candidates. Id.
182. Id. § 102.
183. See id. It is worth noting that the Senate version of this bill was not as strict. Rather than
extend the ban to any corporation that has even 5 percent of its shares owned by a foreign
government or a foreign government official, the Senate bill simply applied the 20 percent voting
share requirement to all corporations. If this bill had cleared the Senate, it would have been
interesting to see which requirements would have been adopted in the conference committee. See
S. 3295, 111th Cong. § 102 (2010).
184. See Political Reform and Gridlock Elimination Act, S.9, 112th Cong. (2011). However,
Senator Reid did not reintroduce the text of the DISCLOSE Act itself. Id.
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rights.
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH
The constitutional issues raised by the DISCLOSE Act and the
other proposed reform bills occupy a gray area between Citizens
United and HLP. As a threshold matter, it should be noted that a
court has never examined the constitutionality of Section 441e’s
current ban on foreign corporations’ campaign spending.185 The
Court in Citizens United expressly stated it was reserving judgment
on that question.186 As Justice Kennedy explained:
We need not reach the question whether the Government
has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals
or associations from influencing our Nation’s political
process. Cf. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (contribution and expenditure
ban applied to “foreign national[s]”). Section 441b[, the
provision at issue in that case,] is not limited to
corporations or associations that were created in foreign
countries or funded predominately by foreign shareholders.
Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if we
assumed, arguendo, that the Government has a compelling
interest in limiting foreign influence over our political
process.187
It is even more difficult to predict what the Court will do when faced
with limits on foreign influence vis-à-vis restrictions on foreigncontrolled and foreign-owned American companies. However, before
tackling that issue it is important to understand the evolution of
corporate campaign spending laws in general and how the Supreme
Court came to view them as political speech.
A. Pre–Citizens United
First Amendment protection for corporate campaign spending
185. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although we have not
reviewed them directly, we have never cast doubt on laws that place special restrictions on
campaign spending by foreign nationals.”). Contra United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037,
1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding the FEC reasonably interpreted Section 441e, barring foreign
nationals from making hard money contributions and soft money donations in connection with
election to “any political office” as applying to federal, state, and local elections).
186. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
187. Id.
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has evolved significantly over the last thirty years. Most importantly,
in the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo188 the Supreme Court
concluded that laws that limit campaign spending threaten basic First
Amendment rights.189 The Court’s finding that “money is speech”
rendered virtually every campaign finance regulation constitutionally
suspect.190 However, federal contribution limits and disclosure
requirements were upheld because a majority of the Court concluded
that they served the governmental interests of limiting “corruption
and the appearance of corruption.”191
But the Court struck down expenditure limits because it found
that the “government interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify section 608(e)(1)’s
ceiling on independent expenditures,” which “do[] not presently
appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to
those identified with large campaign contributions.”192 In the Court’s
estimation, “the absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the
value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.”193 The Court rejected the
government’s argument that steps needed to be taken to “level the
playing field” in campaigns.194 The Court also brushed aside the
government’s suggestion that such limitations were needed because
the amount of money being spent on campaigns was too high.195 The
188. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
189. Id. at 84.
190. Id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 45 (majority opinion).
192. Id. at 45–46.
193. Id. at 47.
194. Id. at 56 (“The interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates competing for
federal office is no more convincing a justification for restricting the scope of federal election
campaigns. Given the limitation on the size of outside contributions, the financial resources
available to a candidate’s campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary
with the size and intensity of the candidate’s support. There is nothing invidious, improper, or
unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate’s message to the electorate.
Moreover, the equalization . . . might serve . . . to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial
name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.”).
195. Id. at 57 (“The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that
spending to promote one’s political views wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society
ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the people . . . who must retain control
over the quantity and range of debate on public issues.”).
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Court clarified, however, that expenditures by a non-candidate that
are “controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his
campaign” may be treated as indirect contributions subject to
FECA’s source and amount limitations to “prevent attempts to
circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures
amounting to disguised contributions.”196
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti197 that “speech that otherwise would be within the
protection of the First Amendment” did not “lose[] that protection
simply because its source is a corporation . . . .”198 The Court ruled a
Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited banks and business
corporations from making contributions and expenditures to
influence the vote on referendum proposals “amount[ed] to an
impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the
identity . . . of the speaker.”199 This decision to protect corporate
speech was “based not only on the role of the First Amendment in
fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording
the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas.”200 In a footnote, however, the Court left open
the possibility that independent expenditures by corporations might
someday beget quid pro quo corruption.201
In 1990, the Court embraced a broader antidistortion rationale
for campaign spending limits. In Austin the Court held that the
government had “articulated a sufficiently compelling rationale to
support its restriction on independent expenditures by corporations”
by pointing to the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
196. Id. at 46–47.
197. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
198. Id. at 784.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 783. According to the Court, “[a] commercial advertisement is constitutionally
protected not so much because it pertains to the seller’s business as because it furthers the societal
interest in the ‘free flow of commercial information.’” Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
201. Id. at 788 n.26. By 1985, however, Justice White in FEC v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee was convinced that “large independent expenditures” do not “appear
to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large [direct]
campaign contributions.” 470 U.S. 480, 510 n.7 (J. White, dissenting) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 46).
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support for the corporation’s political ideas.”202 Under this new
standard for corruption, the Court found that “[c]orporate wealth can
unfairly influence elections when it is employed in the form of
independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of
political contributions.”203 The Court concluded that the Michigan
law banning corporate contributions and expenditures in state
elections was “precisely targeted to eliminate the distortion caused
by corporate spending while also allowing corporations to express
their political views.”204 Thus, Austin held that political speech may
be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.
In McConnell a majority of the Court again emphasized
governmental concerns about corruption and distortion of the
political process.205 The Court invoked the same antidistortion
rationale used in Austin to uphold a federal ban on corporate
disbursements for electioneering communications under section 203
of the BCRA.206 The Court also relied on Buckley to treat coordinated
expenses like contributions.207 It even recognized that such
restrictions on corporate electoral involvement were necessary to
“hedge against ‘circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.’”208
B. Citizens United
Citizens United sets forth the Supreme Court’s latest framework
for analyzing what regulations are acceptable to curb the influence of
corporate money in the political process. The decision did not create
any new legal concepts per se, but it attempted to resolve a conflict
in the earlier cases. Whether it succeeded has yet to be seen.209 But
202. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
203. Id. The Court indicated that this new “corporate-form corruption” could only occur if the
spending were directed toward express advocacy on a candidate’s behalf rather than merely
advocacy for a particular issue. Id. These two realms of advocacy were not new to the Austin
Court; they had been proposed and discussed at length by the Court in Buckley. Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 44. Eventually, the two categories were distinguished by the presence or absence of “magic
words” such as “elect” or “vote against” which would indicate whether a particular advertisement
expressly advocated a candidate’s election or defeat. Id.
204. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
205. 540 U.S. 93, 333 (2003).
206. Id. at 205.
207. Id. at 219; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 447
(2010) (upholding the government’s characterization of party-coordinated spending as the
functional equivalent of contributions).
208. Id. at 205 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)).
209. But see Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
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Citizens United has certainly generated a strong guttural reaction in
the media, in the White House, and in the legislature.210
The case involved a well-funded conservative nonprofit
advocacy group.211 At issue was the organization’s video-on-demand
political documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie. The group feared
that the FEC would prevent it from showing this independent movie
on satellite television because the movie criticized then–presidential
candidate Hillary Clinton within thirty days of a primary election and
constituted an “electioneering communication” paid for with
corporate funds; therefore, the group filed for declaratory and
injunctive relief.212 The Citizens United Court took the rare step of
ordering reargument and supplemental briefing on whether it should
overrule Austin and McConnell to the extent those two opinions
upheld limits on corporations’ independent expenditures that
involved express advocacy based on an antidistortion rationale.213
The majority in Citizens United held, by a 5–4 vote, that federal
laws censoring corporate electioneering expenditures violated the
First Amendment.214 The majority opinion, written by Justice
Kennedy, overturned Austin and partially overturned McConnell.215
REV. 581, 603–17 (2011) (predicting the decision will likely lead to new incoherence in
campaign finance law).
210. See Obama, supra note 173; 156 CONG. REC. S531 (see supra text accompanying note
180); 156 CONG. REC. S6689 (remarks by Sen. Specter) (discussing “the status of an ideological
battleground”); Kasie Hunt, John McCain, Russ Feingold Diverge on Court Ruling, POLITICO
(Jan. 21, 2010, 6:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31810.html; Bradley A.
Smith, President Wrong on Citizens United Case, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:00
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/193894/president-wrong-i-citizens-united-i-case/
bradley-smith.
211. See David Bossie, Written Testimony of David N. Bossie, President of Citizens United,
CITIZENS UNITED (on file with author). Citizens United is an IRC 501(c)(4) organization with
500,000 members and supporters. Id. at 1.
212. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87. Then–Solicitor General Elena Kagan argued
the FEC’s case as the respondent. Id. at 886.
213. Id. at 888. The case was initially dismissed on March 24, 2008, for lack of jurisdiction.
Some critics argue that the case could have been decided on much narrower grounds. See id. at
932 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of
the case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the
law.”).
214. Id. at 913 (majority opinion). Although the case dealt with federal election law, the
decision also rendered unconstitutional state and local laws prohibiting corporate independent
expenditures. Half of the states already allowed corporate and union treasury funds to be used in
state and local elections. The restrictions in those states that did not are now invalid.
215. Id. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia and Alito, with Justice Thomas joining all but Part IV. However, they all filed or joined
concurring opinions as well. The published decision totaled more than 106 pages in length.
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Relying heavily on Bellotti,216 the Court held that the government
cannot restrict a person’s right to speak even if that “person” is a
corporation.217 The Court reaffirmed that the government cannot
make distinctions or impose regulations based on the identity of the
speakers who are exercising their First Amendment rights.218 The
Court highlighted the inconsistency of protecting media
corporations’ political speech but not the political speech of
corporations in other lines of business.219
Justice Stevens authored a strongly worded dissent, consisting of
five objections to the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor.220 Justice Stevens would have
allowed Section 203’s thirty- or sixty-day black out period restriction
on a broadcast independently paid for by a wealthy nonprofit
corporation.221 More importantly, Justice Stevens raised a
fundamental concern about the implications of the majority’s opinion
for regulations preventing foreign influence on American politics.222
Citizens United signaled a dramatic shift in the Court’s
paradigm for corporate political speech.223 Although a full analysis of
the opinion is beyond the scope of this Article, there are a few key
propositions in Citizens United that will impact future efforts to
prevent foreign influence in American politics. First, the Court
completely abandoned the antidistortion rationale as a basis for
justifying federal regulation of campaign elections. The Court

216. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment does not allow political speech
restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity).
217. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 905–06.
220. This case was argued before the Court on September 9, 2009. It was the first case Justice
Sotomayor heard as a member of the Court. See Norman Olch, Justice Sotomayor’s First Oral
Argument Tomorrow Morning, FULL COURT PASS (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.fullcourtpass.com/
2009/09/justice-sotomayors-first-oral-argument.html.
221. See Citizens United, at 929–30.
222. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The government routinely
places special restrictions on . . . foreigners . . . .”); see, e.g., id. at 946 n.44 (“2 U.S.C.
§ 441e(a)(1) (foreign nationals may not directly or indirectly make contributions or independent
expenditures in connection with a U.S. election).”).
223. But some of the groundwork, such as the concept of “corporate personhood,” was in
place long before this case was decided. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780
n.15, (1978) (“It has been settled for almost a century that corporations are persons within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co. 118 U.S.
394 (1886))).
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expressly overruled Austin’s holding that a compelling governmental
interest existed in preventing the “corrosive and distorting effects” of
corporate political spending.224 Citizens United reaffirmed Buckley’s
rejection of the argument to “level the playing field,” stating such
attempts are “foreign to the First Amendment.”225 Without the
antidistortion rationale, the justification for regulating express ads,
but not issue ads, disappeared.226 This made it not only possible but
also logical for Citizens United to extend Chief Justice Roberts’s
conclusion in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.227—that section
441b of FECA was unconstitutional as applied to issue ads—to
express advocacy as well.228
Second, the Court found that corruption is the only compelling
state interest that justifies the regulation of corporate political speech
and associational rights.229 Furthermore, the Court also returned to
Buckley’s narrow definition of corruption as bribery or other quid pro
quo activity.230 Even though “[t]he centerpiece of a [legal] charge of
corruption is intent,”231 the Court adopted an overly simplistic view
of criminal bribery. In the Court’s view, bribery would likely include
a monetary payment to a candidate to procure the improper
performance of his or her official duties, but it would not include
threats to use the same corporate money or influence to defeat the
candidate if he or she did not cooperate.232 The Court missed an
opportunity to move beyond quid pro quo bribery in the corruption
context just as it moved from quid pro quo sexual harassment to
hostile work environment sexual harassment in the employment law
context.233 However, the Court did uphold the government’s interest
224. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. The Court noted that Austin’s rationale was
inconsistent with the prior determinations of Bellotti. Id. at 883–84.
225. Id. at 904–05 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)).
226. Express ads favor or oppose clearly identified candidates by using so-called “magic
words” including “vote for” or “reject,” while issue ads do not. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, n.52.
227. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
228. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 894 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 55 U.S. 449,
481 (2006)).
229. Id. at 883, 908–11.
230. Id. at 885, 908.
231. See Teachout, supra note 34, at 382.
232. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 885.
233. See Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly
Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 533–34 (2006) (describing the evolution of sexual harassment
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in preventing the “appearance of corruption,” which may leave the
door sufficiently ajar to make that argument by analogy.234 The Court
also expressly reserved judgment on whether preventing foreign
influence might be a compelling state interest.235
Third, the Court reinforced Buckley’s rigid distinction between
expenditures and contributions. This was a logical consequence of
the two propositions discussed, supra. The categories of
“expenditures” and “contributions” have become less-than-ideal
proxies for whether strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny applies.236
However, the keystone of the Citizens United analysis was the
exclusion of coordinated expenses from the definition of
“independent expenditures.”237 Earlier, in McConnell, the Court
opined that “expenditures made after a wink or nod often will be as
useful to the candidate as cash[, so] . . .Congress has always treated
expenditures made at the request or suggestion of a candidate as

jurisprudence). This Article is focused on foreign corporations and the use of external regulations
to exclude them from the political process altogether, while a future article will focus on domestic
corporations and their use of internal regulations. Using corporate anti-harassment policies and
ethics compliance programs as a model, corporations can take several practical steps to limit the
corrupting effect of their political speech. See, e.g., FedEx, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
Dec. 6, 2010, available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/FDX/1312281530x0x138778/
6b957b1f-ac83-4b37-835b-8b24e63b338f/code.pdf. These steps include adopting both objective
and subjective standards for corruption not unlike the standards for sexual harassment. See Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993) (stating sexual harassment requires both an
objective and subjective inquiry). It also includes recognizing the role of shareholders and
customers in vetting and enforcing these standards through a private right of action or economic
boycott. For example, gay groups recently boycotted Target and Best Buy for making corporate
donations in the amounts of $150,000 and $100,000 respectively to advocacy group MN Forward.
See David Gura, Mad About Corporate Political Donations, Customers Boycott Target, Best Buy,
NPR NEWS BLOG (Aug. 4, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/08/04/
128974389/mad-about-corporate-political-donations-customers-boycott-target-best-buy.
Even
though the monies were used to fund an independent expenditure campaign, the gay groups
objected to the donations because MN Forward also supported Republican Minnesota
gubernatorial candidate Tom Emmer, who opposes abortion and same-sex marriage and supports
Arizona’s controversial immigration law S.B. 1070. Id.
234. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
235. Id. at 911.
236. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, -- S.Ct. --, 2011
WL 2518813 at 17–21 (June 27, 2011) (applying strict scrutiny to an Arizona law that burdened
independent expenditures); In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 435 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that strict
scrutiny applies to regulation of independent expenditures for political speech); McComish v.
Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 524–26 (9th Cir. 2010) (examining campaign contributions limits under
intermediate scrutiny); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 2011 WL 2457730 at 7 (E.D. Va.
June 16, 2011) (stating that expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny while contribution
limits are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
237. Id. at 910.
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coordinated.”238 Even after Citizens United, as discussed infra, the
definition of coordinated expenses is still subject to interpretation
and needs to be more clearly defined. It is not clear, for example,
whether this definition would cover threats to spend money opposing
a candidate to gain his or her cooperation. However, clarifying this
third category is critical to preventing foreign influence in U.S.
elections through American subsidiaries and their PACs.
Finally, the Court seemed to show a preference for a lessintrusive approach to combating corruption in the future; namely, the
disclaimer and disclosure requirements of BCRA sections 201 and
311.239 The Court concluded that the public’s “informational
interest[s]” were sufficient to uphold the BCRA provisions that make
the political process more transparent by requiring that the sources
for the funding of political speech be identified.240 The Court hinted
that even more rigorous requirements could be constitutionally
imposed as a “less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive
regulations of speech.”241 The Court did, however, acknowledge “that
§ 201 would be unconstitutional as applied to an organization if there
were a reasonable probability that the group’s members would face
threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed.”242
As of publication, 170 published lower court decisions have
applied Citizens United with mixed results.243 A majority of the
courts have cited the opinion for its clear distinction between
contributions and independent expenditures and interpreted the
decision to mean restrictions on contributions are permissible but
limits on independent expenditures are generally not allowable.244
238. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221–22 (2003) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Coordinated expenditures are currently defined as payments, gifts, and loans not
only made on a candidate’s behalf but coordinated with the supported candidate, campaign, or
political party. According to federal regulations, evidence of coordination includes “a written
contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(a)(ii) (2006).
239. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886, 914.
240. Id. at 915–16.
241. Id. at 915.
242. Id. at 916 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198).
243. A list of court decisions as of January 8, 2011, citing Citizens United is on file with the
author.
244. See, e.g., Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684,
691–92, 694–95 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899) (stating “‘the
Supreme Court has generally approved statutory limits on contributions to candidates and
political parties,’ but it ‘has rejected expenditure limits on individuals, groups, candidates, and
parties’” (citation omitted)).

Spring 2011]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

991

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has concluded that
“a narrow class of speech restrictions” affecting either category is
still constitutionally permissible under Citizens United if such a
restriction is “based on an interest in allowing governmental entities
to perform their functions.”245 At the opposite extreme, the District
Court for the Southern District of California refused to uphold a
municipal law banning contributions because the city failed to
demonstrate that the law would actually prevent any corruption.246 At
least one court suggested that the Citizens United decision signaled a
rejection of any sharp distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges to the statute.247 A few courts distinguished Citizens
United on its facts and declined to extend the holding in slightly
different circumstances.248 The D.C. Circuit held that FECA’s
organizational and continuous reporting requirements did not violate
the First Amendment; such disclosure requirements were justified by
a compelling state interest in determining and helping to “expose
violations of other campaign finance restrictions, such as those
245. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 980–81, 984 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 899) (concluding that while Citizens United broadly prohibited restrictions
on “political speech,” it reconfirmed the validity of the Letter Carriers line of cases, which
specifically targeted political activity by government employees).
246. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1073–74 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(declining to uphold a ban on contributions when the city had failed to demonstrate that the
contribution bans in question would actually prevent any corruption or that the ban was “closely”
drawn enough and noting that while the Supreme Court had upheld limitations and bans on
contributions, it had done so only when the threat of corruption had been proven); see also
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, No. 09-CV-2826-IEG, 2010 WL 1201885, at *7 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 23, 2010) (denying the city’s request for a stay so that it could enact new laws—including
new disclosure requirements to deal with contributions made by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations—in response to Citizens United).
247. Sonnier v. Crain, 613 F.3d 436, 469–70 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that Citizens United “has
contradicted the erroneous idea that there is one single test for all facial challenges; on the
contrary, the facial/as-applied distinction does not have any ‘automatic effect’ on the disposition
of a case”).
248. N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 676 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the
New Mexico government’s claim that Citizens United abandoned the requirement that for a
regulation of campaign-related speech to be constitutional it must be “unambiguously campaign
related”); Preminger v. Shinseki, No. C 04-2012 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 2077151, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
May 21, 2010) (concluding Citizens United is not directly on point because it addresses speech in
the context of campaign spending rather than voter registration); Citizens in Charge v. Brunner,
No. 2:10-cv-95, 2010 WL 519814, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2010) (concluding Buckley, not
Citizens United, controlled the case because “‘ballot initiatives do not involve the risk of “quid
pro quo” corruption present when money is paid to, or for, candidates’”) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 203) (1976); Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 621 (Colo. 2010) (rejecting a
challenge to certain contribution limits noting that the Citizens United Court was dealing with
independent expenditures).
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barring contributions from foreign corporations or individuals.”249
Finally, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend Citizens United to
restrict expenditure limits as applied to a coordinated radio
advertisement that a political-party committee planned to run as its
own.250
C. Foreign Campaign Money:
Unprotected Speech or Unconstitutional Xenophobia?
Campaign spending by foreign corporations is best categorized
as wholly unprotected speech. Despite the Court’s herculean efforts
in Citizens United to get at the constitutional issues surrounding
campaign finance laws, foreign spending on U.S. campaigns is the
one major area of campaign finance law not yet constitutionalized.
The regulation of political expenditures by foreign corporations is
the 800-pound gorilla that the Supreme Court has never confronted.
The Citizens United Court expressly reserved judgment on whether
the same restrictions were constitutional as applied to foreign
corporations.251 Several times, Justice Stevens in his dissent warned
of the ominous threat foreign corporations pose to the majority’s
analysis, to no avail.252 The majority’s silence could be interpreted as
acquiescence to unconstitutional xenophobia. However, I argue that
both logic and history support the conclusion that the First
Amendment should not protect foreign campaign money.
Under Citizens United, the government can only limit corporate
speech if it poses a great risk of corruption or the appearance of
corruption.253 This absolutist test, while extremely protective of
freedom of speech, does not adequately address the danger posed by
foreign corporations. The rationale for regulating foreign
corporations is actually much broader than the anti-corruption
249. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Keating v.
FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
250. In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 422–23 (5th Cir. 2010).
251. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911–12.
252. Id. at 936 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority . . . appears to suggest . . .
domestic corporations have a better claim than foreign corporations.”); id. at 945 (“The
Government routinely places special restrictions [such as § 441e] on . . . foreigners. . . .”); id. at
947 (“Although we have not reviewed them directly, we have never cast doubt on laws [like
§ 441e] that place special restrictions on campaign spending by foreign nationals.”); id. at 971
(warning that corporations are very different from natural persons because “[u]nlike voters in
U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled”).
253. Id. at 908–11.
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justification for regulating their domestic counterparts because
foreign financial participation in U.S. elections subverts American
citizens’ right of self-government. Most legal commentators that
have considered this question have reached the same conclusion.254
Some have convincingly argued the domestic subsidiary loophole
created by the FEC is inconsistent with legislative intent.255 Others
have discussed favorably the reasons and incentives for states to
deny foreign nationals certain political rights.256 Even those that have
argued against extending the ban on contributions by foreign
nationals have recognized that the right of Congress to prevent
foreign influence in American politics likely outweighs any rights
possessed by foreign nationals.257
Likewise, many public officials have taken a similar stand.258
During the amendments to FARA in 1966, Senator J. William
Fulbright chaired hearings that cast a shadow of suspicion over
foreign powers pumping money into the U.S. political system and
influencing policy in the process.259 During the campaign finance
254. See Brown, supra note 107, at 548–52; Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of
Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1441–43 (2009); Lori
Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 49–50 (1989); Savrin, supra note 130, at 818. See
generally Fang, supra note 20 (discussing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce practice of obtaining
foreign funding to attack and defeat Democratic candidates).
255. See, e.g., Savrin, supra note 130, at 803–04 (criticizing the FEC for ruling in its advisory
opinions that FARA’s strict definition of foreign nationals does not include domestic corporations
that are owned by foreign nationals).
256. See, e.g., Cox & Posner, supra note 254, at 1441–48 (discussing how a state may hesitate
to offer voting or political rights to foreigners because they may either be under-informed of the
issues surrounding national, state, and local politics or they may be hostile or opposed to the
interests usually favored by the nation, state, or local community).
257. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 107, at 527–29 (contrasting the numerous ways the
government lawfully bars aliens from participating in the American democratic process with a
few of the avenues that are open for aliens to participate in politics in the United States). But
Brown contends First Amendment scrutiny should be applied to cases regarding political
spending by PRAs because the United States’ history of denying voting rights to aliens does not
necessarily ensure that they have no rights to political speech. Id. at 530–34.
258. See 156 CONG. REC. S6266 (daily ed. July 27, 2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken)
(“The fact is, after Citizens United, the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies will be able to
spend as much as they want in our elections, even if they are under foreign control.”); 120 CONG.
REC. 8782–83 (1974).
259. See Damrosch, supra note 254, at 22 (commenting that the hearings by Senator J.
William Fulbright and his committee “vividly document the efforts of certain foreign interests to
ensure the reelection of sympathetic legislators by channeling campaign contributions through
lawyers or other agents in Washington”). Senator Fulbright spoke of preserving “the integrity of
the decision-making process of our Government” and needing to deal with the “growing use” of
foreigners of “nondiplomatic means to influence Government policies.” 111 CONG. REC. 6984–
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reforms of 1974, Senator Bentsen emphatically denounced any
notion that foreigners had a right to participate in the U.S. political
process.260 His amendment was criticized by Senators Barry
Goldwater and Robert Griffin for not going far enough.261 Most
recently, President Obama and several leading Democrats have come
out strongly in favor of preventing foreign influence in elections.262
Not unexpectedly, public opinion takes a dim view of extending
political-speech rights to foreign corporations, particularly when it
comes to financial participation in U.S. campaigns and elections.263 A
recent poll conducted by the Washington Post showed that eight in
ten Americans disagreed with the Court’s decision in Citizens
United.264 Further, the poll indicated that opposition was prevalent on
both sides of the political aisle: 85 percent of Democrats opposed the
Court’s decision along with 76 percent of Republicans.265
Finally, the courts are no exception. No foreign corporation
located outside the United States has ever been formally extended the
right to participate in our political process or even been given
political-speech rights. In other contexts the Supreme Court has
extended constitutional protections to aliens subjected to the
85 (1965) (statement of Sen. Fulbright). His sentiments were shared in the House by
Representative Emanuel Celler, who criticized the “highly questionable conduct” and “unethical
practices” of foreigners and their agents in their attempts to influence the U.S. political arena. 112
CONG. REC. 10,537 (1966). Representative William Dorn “particularly commend[ed]” the bill for
its ability to prevent “foreign agents from making political contributions.” Id. at 10,538.
260. 120 CONG. REC. 8783. But see id. at 8784 (statement of Sen. Cannon) (challenging the
need to ban contributions by aliens within the United States by saying that “[i]f [Senator Bentsen]
were to restrict the amendment to money coming from abroad, from foreign nationals abroad, or
foreign nationals living abroad, or foreign contributions of any sort, [Sen. Cannon] would
completely agree with him”).
261. Id. at 8782. Senators Goldwater and Griffin sought to amend the laws to ban money that
was issued from foreign banks even if American citizens were using them. Id.
262. Dan Eggen & Scott Wilson, Obama Steps Up Attack on Chamber, WASH. POST, Oct. 11,
2010, at A1.
263. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign
Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html; Lydia Saad, Public Agrees with Court:
Campaign Money Is “Free Speech”, GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
125333/public-agrees-court-campaign-money-free-speech.aspx (citing a Gallup poll concluding
that 55 percent of Americans polled felt that campaign donations were a form of free speech but
that a majority also felt that limitations on campaign contributions were needed anyway).
264. Eggen, supra note 263. Conservatives criticized this poll for “poorly worded” questions,
claiming the poll slanted results. Sean Parnell, Poorly Worded Poll on Citizens United Decision,
CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POL. (Feb. 17, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/
blog/detail/poorly-worded-poll-on-citizens-united-decision.
265. Eggen, supra note 263.
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extraterritorial activity of the U.S. government.266 For example, in the
Guantanamo Bay cases, the Court declared that foreign prisoners are
entitled to habeas corpus rights under the U.S. Constitution.267 But no
case has ever been successfully brought by a foreign individual or
corporation under the First Amendment.
Within the boundaries of the United States, the Supreme Court
has also been willing to yield to Congress’s judgment.268 This has
been true even when foreign nationals have engaged in political
activity.269 The lower courts have also favored allowing Congress to
restrict foreign political speech.270
266. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (ruling that foreign nationals are
entitled to rights of habeas corpus and that the military tribunals were an inappropriate substitute
for habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (holding that Muslims taken
prisoner during the War on Terror were entitled to protections under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (concluding that American courts do
have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay).
267. In Boumediene, for example, a Bosnian citizen detained at Guantanamo Bay after being
captured in Afghanistan successfully challenged the legality of his detainment as well as the
constitutionality of the military tribunals being used by the U.S. government to try prisoners from
the War on Terror. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770–73, 791–96. Contra Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 790–91 (1950) (ruling that German prisoners held by the U.S. Army during World War
II had no rights to habeas corpus).
268. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (declaring that Congress possesses “broad
power” over immigration and naturalization matters that allows Congress to create “rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens”); see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)
(noting that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized that ‘over no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens” and that
“[o]ur cases ‘have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from
judicial control’”) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) and
Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
269. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 643, 649 (1973) (not addressing the question of whether
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees aliens the right to vote, but noting that “implicit in many
of [its] voting rights decisions is the notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting
such rights”); see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (declaring the rights of the states
to deny involvement in democratic activities to foreigners). “[I]t is clear that a State may deny
aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political
institutions.” Id. The Supreme Court has also ruled that states have the power to ban aliens from
certain government jobs. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1981) (“The exclusion of
aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system but a
necessary consequence of the community’s process of political self-definition.”). Contra United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (issuing in a case
involving the denial of citizenship to a pacifist alien, a passionate declaration that “if there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other[,] it is the
principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate”).
270. E.g., Moving Phones P’ship L.P. v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(recognizing that national security required rational basis scrutiny of the prohibition of alien
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Foreign campaign spending serves no purpose other than to
corrupt and distort the political process in the United States in
furtherance of the foreign corporations’ interests. First, allowing
foreign entities to financially participate in the election process poses
an unacceptable risk of quid pro quo corruption. A large percentage
of foreign companies doing business in the United States are based in
countries like China, India, and Mexico, where cultures of bribery
exist that are far worse than in the United States.271 Political
contributions are commonly used in those countries to gain improper
business advantages once a candidate is in office.272 The risk of
bribery is particularly acute in the defense industry, which also raises
national security concerns. If foreign campaign contributions are
unrestricted, successful political candidates and incumbents will not
be able to avoid considering foreign interests when making U.S.
policy in these critical areas. Therefore, the FEC should be allowed
to continue to enforce existing regulatory bans on foreign
contributions. In addition, the federal government (and potentially
private actors) should be allowed to apply criminal and civil liability
against foreign corporations seeking to gain undue influence over the
U.S. political process.273
Second, foreign money distorts the political process in a way
that cannot be justified after Citizens United, because the speakers
are noncitizens. Its implication for the right of self-determination
goes beyond the potential corruption caused by foreign money.
Foreign financing can change the outcome of an election. It can
enable a candidate to receive more support and exposure in the
media than would be possible absent foreign advocates. This unfairly
props up a marginal candidate who would otherwise likely drop out
of an election race due to a lack of financial support from other
Americans. More importantly, it drowns out American voices that
ownership of American media rather than strict scrutiny); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 139
(D. Md. 1974) (concluding that federal and state law may require one to be a citizen to serve as a
member of a jury without violating the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
271. Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope
of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 440–41
(2009).
272. Id. at 427–29.
273. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006) (stating that current penalties consist of fines
decided on by the FEC or imprisonment for up to five years depending on the significance of the
violation).
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remain unsubsidized by foreign principals. Self-determination
constitutes the “right of a people to freely determine its political and
legal status without interference by any foreign individual or
organization.”274 Even if money is speech and corporations are
persons, the right to political self-determination demands the ability
to exclude foreign corporations from participating financially in U.S.
elections. Congress might choose, for various political reasons, to
extend some political-speech privileges to noncitizens (and it has
with PRAs),275 but such an exercise of legislative power does not by
itself create a constitutional mandate. On the contrary, in a
democratic society the system is designed to reflect the will of its
citizens, and only its citizens.276
IV. RESTRICTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF
FOREIGN-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
The political branches of the U.S. government should enjoy
wide constitutional latitude to regulate the political speech of not
only foreign corporations but foreign-controlled and foreign-owned
American corporations as well. The arguments in favor of this
second proposition are more complicated than the case for regulating
foreign corporations as set forth in Part III supra. There are,
however, at least three potential approaches to making this argument.
The first approach would be to use the political-question doctrine to
insist that the Court defer to the political branches’ judgment because
it is a foreign relations issue.277 The problem is this deference may
not extend to constitutional violations under the separation of powers
doctrine. A second approach would be to argue that the matter falls
within Congress’s plenary authority to regulate immigration.278 The
274. Savrin, supra note 130, at 787.
275. 120 CONG. REC. 8783 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (“My amendment would
exempt foreigners with resident immigrant status from the ban on contributions by foreigners.
There are many resident immigrants in the United States who have lived here for years and who
spend most of their adult lives in this country; they pay American taxes and for all intents and
purposes are citizens of the United States except perhaps in the strictest legal sense of the word.
These individuals should not be precluded from contributing to the candidate of their
choice . . . .”).
276. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (2d ed. 1986)
(stating that the distinguishing characteristic of our system of government is “the policy-making
power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process”).
277. See infra text accompanying notes 288–309.
278. See infra text accompanying notes 310–49.
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Court has long recognized this power as resting in the United States’
inherent sovereignty as a nation-state, but there is little evidence that
the Law of Nations (the ultimate source of national sovereignty
which today is more commonly referred to as customary
international law (CIL))279 demands national rules limiting foreign
participation in domestic politics. Therefore, we are left with only
one other viable option: confronting the First Amendment issue
head-on.280 The Court in HLP explored each of these paths to varying
degrees; therefore, the case makes a good starting point for this
discussion.
HLP involved a content-based restriction on speech under 18
U.S.C. § 2339B, which outlaws “knowingly provid[ing] material
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” with
“material support resources.”281 The statute restricts “a narrow
category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with
foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist
organizations.”282 It covers speech that teaches a “specific skill” or
imports “specialized knowledge” like legal advice.283 It also includes
engaging in “political advocacy.”284
The majority in HLP held that the restriction was not
unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the plaintiffs’ free
speech or association rights.285 The Court also noted that the
279. See Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transactional
Corporations Are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Law, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L.
385, 412–13 (2010).
280. See infra text accompanying notes 352–74.
281. The statute defines “material support or resources” as “any property, tangible or
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel . . . , and transportation, except medical and religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)
(2006).
282. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010) (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ claim that the statute impeded “pure political speech”
because nothing in the statute prevented the appellants from discussing the issue of the Patiya
Karkeran Kurdistan or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil or advocating the different causes
independently; all the statute required was that the groups not coordinate their speech with
foreign terrorist groups. Id. at 2722–23.
283. Id. at 2724.
284. Id. at 2723 n.4. According to the Court, political advocacy only falls into this narrow
category if it is coordinated with a foreign organization that is known to be engaged in terrorism.
Id. at 2723.
285. Id. at 2721–22. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the statutory language was
too vague for them to be aware of what would be held acceptable under the statute and what
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petitioners failed to sufficiently describe the speech in which they
intended to engage, which made it impossible for the Court to rule on
whether the statute was overly vague concerning their intentions.286
Thus, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that restrictions on
“political advocacy” violated their First Amendment rights, because
the Court found that it was impossible to decide the issue without
more details.287 Although the Supreme Court did not fully explore the
First Amendment path in HLP, it did leave a bread crumb trail of
dicta to follow in future cases. As I argue in more detail supra, the
HLP opinion suggests that the government may be justified in
limiting some forms of speech by American individuals and
nonprofit advocacy groups (and, by extension, any domestic
corporation) when the speech is coordinated with a foreign entity.
A. More Than a Political Question
The first line of argument for extending the Section 441e ban on
foreign campaign contributions and independent expenditures to
foreign-owned or foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiaries is that the
foreign relations interests at stake require deference to the legislative
branch’s decision to limit foreign influence on American politics.
The argument can be taken a step beyond mere deference by
invoking the political-question doctrine, which is a constitutional
limitation on Article III’s judicial power and bars courts from
resolving issues more appropriately committed to other branches of
government.288 If the U.S. Constitution shows that the people made a
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” to entrusting a
constitutional provision’s ultimate interpretation to either the
legislative or executive branches, as the argument goes, then that
text’s interpretation may be completely the duty of that branch, and
not of the judiciary.289 Other relevant factors in determining whether
a case presents a political question include the lack of “judicially
discoverable and manageable standards” for resolving an issue and
the existence of other prudential considerations that counsel for

would not. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 2729.
288. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
289. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring).
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judicial abstention.290 In addition, a statement from the executive
branch can play a significant role in a court’s determination of
whether the political-question doctrine bars a suit.291
Focusing on the other side of the transaction, the act of state
doctrine also militates against judicial interference in foreign
policy.292 The act of state doctrine has the same “‘constitutional’
underpinnings” as the political-question doctrine, as it arises from the
basic relationships between branches of government under the
separation of powers.293 It too is concerned with the judicial branch’s
competence “to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in
the area of international relations.”294 The act of state doctrine
generally requires a federal case involving the taking of property or
another act of “governmental character” by a foreign state within its
own territory not otherwise governed by international law.295 Even if
the act of state, validity, and situs requirements are met, the Supreme
Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino296 suggested that
when applying this doctrine to acts other than expropriation, other
factors must be considered, including: (1) how sharply a particular
issue “touch[es] . . . on national nerves,” (2) the “degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law,” and (3) the “implications of an issue . . . for our
foreign relations.”297
The political-question doctrine played a significant role in the
Supreme Court’s decision in HLP. The State Department submitted
an affidavit in the case, stating that its experience and analysis
“suppor[ted] Congress’s finding that all contributions to foreign
terrorist organizations further their terrorism.”298 The Court ruled that
an “evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s
290. Id. at 996.
291. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (requiring courts to give
“serious weight” to the executive branch’s view when it files a statement opposing the litigation).
292. See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 785–90 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the validity of a foreign act of state in certain circumstances
is a “political question” not cognizable in our courts).
293. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
294. Id.
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 (1987).
296. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
297. Id. at 428.
298. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010).
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assessment, is entitled to deference” because the “litigation
implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and
foreign affairs.”299 The Court recognized its own incompetence
“when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences
in this area” and reaffirmed that “it is vital in this context ‘not to
substitute . . . [the Court’s] own evaluation of evidence for a
reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.’”300 The majority
felt that Justice Breyer, in his dissent, “slight[ed] these real
constraints in demanding hard proof—with ‘detail,’ ‘specific facts,’
and ‘specific evidence.’”301 The majority recognized that
“information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain
conduct difficult to assess” when confronting “evolving threats” to
“national security and foreign policy.”302 Nevertheless, the Court did
not go so far as to suggest that the political-question doctrine can
excuse constitutional violations. In the end, the Court refused to
abdicate its judicial role in interpreting the freedom of speech and
asssociation clauses, stating, “We do not defer to the Government’s
reading of the First Amendment, even when such interests are at
stake.”303
Likewise, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court vacillated
between deferring to the political branches and demanding strict
empirical data supporting a particular campaign finance rule. On the
one hand, the Court was satisfied with its longstanding determination
(sans empirical data) that contributions carry with them a substantial
risk of corruption.304 On the other hand, the Court did not feel that the
government sufficiently demonstrated that independent expenditures
posed as great a risk as contributions.305 Thus, even after Citizens
United, it is difficult to predict how deferential the Court would be to
Congress’s determination that expanding Section 441e to foreigncontrolled domestic corporations is both logically and historically
necessary to prevent foreign influence in U.S. elections.
Currently, there is a dearth of information on the contributions
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id.
Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981)).
Id. at 2727 (quoting id. at 2735, 2739, 2743 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
Id.
Id.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 883–84.
Id. at 883.

1002

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:951

and independent expenditures of foreign-controlled corporations.
More rigorous disclosure rules would help the government collect
and present the courts with empirical evidence to support the
proposed restrictions. In the interim, the strongest argument for
preventing foreign influence in American politics is the historical
one set forth in Part I supra. The counterargument is that Madison
and the other Framers argued that larger countries can better prevent
corruption than smaller ones.306 While foreign corruption is still a
serious problem in many lesser-developed or war-torn countries, so
the argument would go, perhaps the United States as the world’s only
superpower is now immune from foreign influence. However, this
argument is blunted by the concomitant rise of multinationals with
aggregations of wealth unimaginable to the Framers. Therefore, on
balance we still have a significant risk of exactly the kind of
corrupting relationships that the Framers sought to prevent from
destroying democracy. Faced with this reality, the Court would likely
defer to Congress’s determination that preventing foreign influence
is a government interest of the highest order. However, the Court
would still be free under the separation of powers doctrine to conduct
a First Amendment analysis of any speech restrictions justified on
that basis.
B. The Imperfect Right of a Sovereign Nation
A second line of argument is based on the United States’
“inherent sovereignty.”307 In the absence of textual guidance, courts
306. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 42, at 81–84 (James Madison).
307. The concept of sovereignty defies simple definition. It is most often associated with
territorial sovereignty or jurisdiction. As Joseph Story put it, “[N]o sovereignty can extend its
process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial
decisions.” JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD
TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS 787 (2d ed. 1841); see also
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (“[J]urisdiction based on physical presence
alone constitutes due process,” without regard to questions of “fairness” or “reasonableness.”);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”). From this vantage point sovereignty
is seen as the product of a nation’s power to govern. JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 25 (M.J. Tooley trans., Basil Blackwell 1955) (1576) (defining sovereignty as
“absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth”). Others have suggested that
sovereignty exists as a fundamental principle of the natural Law of Nations. EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 2 (Joseph Chitty trans., The New Edition
1867) (1758) (basing the Law of Nations on the fundamental principle of “sovereign equality”
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may review laws regulating foreign influence on the U.S. political
process wholly on extra-constitutional grounds. In cases related to
immigration, the courts have built a constitutional jurisprudence
based on powers inherent in the United States’ national and
international sovereignty.308 Notwithstanding the principle of
enumerated powers, the Supreme Court found the power to exclude
foreigners to be “an incident of sovereignty” incorporated into the
federal power to conduct foreign affairs.309 The federal government
can refuse entry to aliens or deport them, making the issue of their
political speech rights moot.310 Because the source of this power
antecedes the U.S. Constitution, the power is considered generally
immune to constitutional restraints.311 “[C]ourts have invoked
sovereignty as an almost mythical force animating the plenary,
unreviewable immigration power.”312
Some courts have questioned the legitimacy of Congress’s
plenary authority to control immigration. However, Congress’s
power in this area is derived from the Framers’ original
among all nations irrespective of power differentials); see also Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11
U.S. 116, 137 (1812) (“This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns . . . has
been stated to be the attribute of every nation.”). This Article assumes Vattel’s notion of inherent
sovereignty best comports with the Framers’ intent and the legal reasoning behind the Supreme
Court jurisprudence discussed herein.
308. See generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience:
Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 25 (1985) (exploring
the Court’s use of inherent powers in the Chinese Exclusion Case).
309. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). In the Chinese Exclusion
Case, the Supreme Court held that Congress has plenary authority over immigration pursuant not
only to the enumerated power to regulate commerce with foreign nations but also to inherent
national and international sovereignty powers including the rights of the sovereign to control its
territory and safeguard its security. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). Therefore, immigration laws are
not subject to constitutional restraint. Later the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976), extended this plenary power doctrine to permit Congress to discriminate against aliens in
the grant of affirmative government welfare benefits. Id. at 79–80.
310. Later cases have addressed the lack of constitutional protection for immigrants regarding
admission, discrimination, or even indefinite internment. Henkin, supra note 308, at 28 &
nn.106–07.
311. Id. at 26–27; Pringle, supra note 27, at 2077. For example, Congress was permitted to
exclude or deport an alien for political activity that could not support a criminal conviction
because it would not constitute deprivation of liberty without due process of law. See, e.g.,
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). But
see Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in
Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 83 (1989) (“The Court [in the Chinese Exclusion
Case] was undoubtedly caught up in the racist and nativist xenophobia of the era. . . . The fiction
of sovereignty masked the Court’s underlying bigotry by providing the decision with a seemingly
objective disinfectant.”).
312. Pringle, supra note 27, at 2077.
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understanding of the Law of Nations. More specifically, there is
considerable evidence the Framers relied heavily on Emmrich de
Vattel’s conception of the Law of Nations.313 Under his theory, CIL
was based on the fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of
all nation-states.314 This sovereignty principle necessarily implies a
nation-state’s right to control its territory and safeguard its
security.315 Although CIL principally governs the relationship
between sovereign nations, it also deals with relations between an
alien and a foreign state such as the United States.
In non-immigration cases, however, the Court has held that the
extra-constitutional powers inherent in sovereignty are subject to
constitutional limitations.316 Initially, Ross v. McIntyre317 held that the
Constitution does not apply abroad.318 After World War II, the Court
reversed itself in Reid v. Covert319 and held the Constitution still
governed the extraterritorial actions of U.S. officials towards U.S.
citizens.320 Since Reid, aliens here and abroad have been entitled to
constitutional protection against certain kinds of governmental
action.321 In the recent battles over the rights of detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay, for example, the Supreme Court agreed that even
when the United States acts outside its borders, the Constitution

313. Vega, supra note 279, at 412–13.
314. Id. at 413.
315. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–04
(1889).
316. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958) (“Broad as the power of the National
Government to regulate foreign affairs must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The
restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in
the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other
nations.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
317. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
318. Id. at 464, 479 (holding that the Constitution is for U.S. territory only and only applies to
citizens and others within the United States).
319. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
320. Id. at 12.
321. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–13 (1982) (holding that the equal protection clause
protects illegal aliens); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489–91 (1931)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation clause entitles a foreign corporation to
protection). Contra United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search by American authorities of the Mexican
residence of a Mexican citizen and resident who had no voluntary attachment to the United
States); Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1338–39
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 744 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to consider noncitizens’ Eighth and
Ninth Amendment claims because they raised nonjusticiable political questions).
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limits its powers.322
Thus, the issue is whether campaign finance laws banning
foreign-controlled corporate spending are more like immigration
control laws or more like the laws at issue in the non-immigration
cases. If Section 441e is analogous to the immigration cases, then it
is not subject to constitutional restraint; but if it is more akin to the
non-immigration cases, it will be subject to constitutional restraint.
The HLP Court does not discuss the sovereignty issue per se. It may
be surmised, however, from its discussion of the political-question
doctrine that if the Court was reluctant to abdicate its duty to
interpret First Amendment rights in the face of a national security
matter, it will be equally reluctant to defer to congressional efforts to
protect the integrity of the U.S. political process even on the basis of
sovereignty.323
On balance, it appears this plenary power over foreign relations
must be weighed against the demands of the First Amendment for at
least three reasons. First, alien constitutional rights ostensibly
increase in direct proportion to an alien’s contacts with the United
States.324 This sliding scale approach is implied by the manner in
which existing campaign finance laws treat PRAs.325 Although they
cannot vote, PRAs can volunteer for campaign work, make
donations, and independently spend money in support of or in
opposition to a particular candidate or political issue.326 In October
322. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (holding that enemy combatants were
entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus). The Court did note that certain circumstances allowed
for this exercise of jurisdiction; most notably the fact that the United States exercised “complete
and total control” over Guantanamo Bay. Id. Contra In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies
in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167–72 (2008) (holding, as a matter of first impression, that the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted abroad by U.S. agents
and such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
reasonableness).
323. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010).
324. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 793–95 (concluding that detention by the United States is a
contact that merits habeas corpus and possibly other criminal procedure rights guaranteed by the
Constitution); 120 CONG. REC. 8783 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (indicating that PRAs
enjoy the most extensive rights of any type of foreign national as they pay taxes and demonstrate
an intention to live in the United States for an indefinite period of time). Contra Matthews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (stating that simply entering the borders of the United States as
an immigrant guarantees little in the way of constitutional rights and that Congress has broad
discretion in this area).
325. Brown, supra note 107, at 503–04; Note, “Foreign” Campaign Contributions and the
First Amendment, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1886, 1895–99 (1997); Pringle, supra note 27, at 2074–75.
326. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2002) (stating that the definition of “foreign national” exempts PRAs
from the prohibition); FEC Foreign Nationals Brochure, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (July 2003),
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2010 a lawsuit was filed in federal court on behalf of two aliens
lawfully residing and working in the United States who wished to
contribute to U.S. candidates and make independent expenditures in
U.S. campaigns.327 One plaintiff was a Canadian with a TN work
visa; the other plaintiff was admitted to the United States as a J1status non-immigrant.328 The complaint alleged that Section 441e and
its regulations (which it referred to as the “Alien Gag Law”) as
applied to aliens who lawfully reside and work in the United States
violates the First Amendment.329 The complaint also invoked the
BCRA’s judicial-review provisions, which placed the case before a
three-judge federal district court in Washington, D.C. and put it on a
fast track for review by the U.S. Supreme Court.330 The district court
denied the plaintiffs’ application for a three-judge court holding that
the FEC regulations’ constitutionality is not appropriately challenged
in a three-judge court; however, it did request that the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals appoint a three-judge court to review the plaintiffs’
constitutional challenge to BCRA § 303’s prohibition of
contributions by foreign nationals, which is codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441e(a)(1).331 The three-judge district court not only denied the
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment but also granted the FEC’s
motion to dismiss.332 The court concluded the federal ban on
campaign spending by foreign nationals is constitutional even under
strict scrutiny because the statute is narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling government interest “in limiting the participation of
foreign citizens in activities of American democratic selfgovernment, and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the

http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/foreign.shtml#Individuals_Green_Card.
327. Bluman v. FEC, No. 1:10-CV-01766 (RMV)(D.D.C.) (filed Oct. 19, 2010).
328. Complaint at ¶¶ 10, 15, Bluman v. FEC, No. 1:10-CV-01766 (RMV)(D.D.C.) (filed Oct.
19, 2010).
329. Id. ¶ 26.
330. Id. ¶ 6. A Supreme Court decision not to hear a direct appeal has precedential value;
therefore, it makes it more likely that the Court will actually hear the case on appeal should it be
appealed.
331. See Bluman v. FEC, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 223 (2003)); Kenneth P. Doyle, History of Limits on Foreign Campaign Money Traced
by FEC in Response to New Lawsuit, BNA MONEY & POL. REP., (Dec. 27, 2010) (on file with
author).
332. See Bluman v. FEC, Civil No. 1:10-CV-01766 (D.D.C.) (Aug. 11, 2011), available at
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2010cv1766-37.
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U.S. political process.”333
One could argue that American corporations owned by foreign
parent companies but operating in the United States are analogous to
PRAs and should be treated in kind. However, the 1974 Bentsen
Amendment, which first exempted PRAs, appears to reflect
Congress’s political judgment (read compromise) rather than any
perceived constitutional mandate.334 If so, Congress could change its
mind. Thus, the argument by analogy to PRAs is not dispositive but
does weigh in favor of conducting a First Amendment analysis.
Second, the American public has a right to receive
information—even from noncitizens.335 In Citizens United, Justice
Kennedy was clearly concerned about the harm to “‘society as a
whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.’”336
He concluded that “[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak,
and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlightened self-government . . . .”337 This obviously includes the
right to information from foreigners who can provide a different
perspective on public policy issues. However, giving foreigncontrolled corporations an absolute right to spend money in U.S.
political campaigns would effectively turn the right to selfgovernment on its head.
The modern paradigm of the First Amendment has undeniably
shifted from the individual speaker on the street corner to mass
media predominated by large corporations.338 This reality militates in
favor of carefully protecting our national sovereignty from being
trampled by foreign corporate concerns directly or indirectly.
Moreover, in today’s digital age the voice of the individual has
333. Id. at 10.
334. See supra text accompanying note 270.
335. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”); see also Waters,
supra note 107, at 805 (discussing the impact of indirect restraints on free speech). See generally
Nadia L. Luhr, Iran, Social Media, and U.S. Trade Sanctions: The First Amendment Implications
of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 500, 500 (2010) (giving examples of
Twitter and Web 2.0 tools in use in Iran).
336. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896 (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).
337. Id. at 898; accord OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1998); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1948);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
338. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409 (1986);
Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
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begun to reemerge with blogs, wikis, and other low-cost methods of
communication made possible by the Internet. Thus, the money of
corporations owned or controlled by noncitizens is not necessary to
preserve our form of self-government. Nevertheless, the First
Amendment is still needed to determine the extent to which such
spending can be constitutionally restricted to prevent foreign
influence.
Alternatively, the right to receive information from foreigncontrolled corporations also seems to follow from a major premise of
Citizens United; namely, “the First Amendment stands against
attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.”339 According to
the majority, “restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others,”340 are constitutionally
prohibited because “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”341
However, Justice Stevens demonstrated that the majority opinion in
this regard proved too much:
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the
identity of a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s
ability to regulate political speech would lead to some
remarkable conclusions . . . . More pertinently, it would
appear to afford the same protection to multinational
corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual
Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could “‘enhance the
relative voice’” of some (i.e., humans) over others (i.e.,
nonhumans).342
In Justice Stevens’s estimation, Justice Kennedy all but admitted that
an absolute rule against restrictions based on speaker identity is
“untenable” when he acknowledged that Congress might be allowed
to take measures aimed at “preventing foreign individuals or
associations from influencing our Nation’s political process.”343 As
Justice Stevens further explained, “Such measures have been a part
of U.S. campaign finance law for many years. The notion that
339. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 899.
342. Id. at 947–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 921 (majority opinion)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976))).
343. Id. at 948 n.51.
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Congress might lack the authority to distinguish foreigners from
citizens in the regulation of electioneering would certainly have
surprised the Framers . . . .”344
Third, CIL must continue to evolve before the right to exclude
foreign-controlled political speech can be recognized as “perfect,” to
use Vattel’s term.345 Under Vattel’s analytical framework, CIL
consists of only perfect rights.346 In the late eighteenth century,
campaign-spending regulations were categorized as “imperfect”
rights, leaving each nation free to decide the content of those rules.
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, an evolving concept of
CIL.347 This means that occasionally the Court steps outside the
known boundaries of conventional international law and expands our
common understanding, thereby incorporating it into the Supreme
Law of the Land.348 But this generally requires a particular rule to be
universally viewed as mandatory and widely practiced. Currently,
there is no evidence of universal consensus on this point. According
to the latest information available, only thirty-eight of 218 countries
surveyed prohibit foreign corporate donations.349 Lesser-developed
countries and areas affected by war are the most susceptible to
foreign influence.350 However, few nations other than the United
States expressly regulate independent expenditures. The lack of any
mandate from CIL leaves the need for a full consideration of the
344. Id.
345. Vega, supra note 279, at 390.
346. For Vattel, the Law of Nations actually consisted of two separate lines of authority:
(1) the necessary law of a nation, which reflected the natural Law of Nations; and (2) the
voluntary law of nations, which was a positivist construct of rights sufficiently “perfect” to derive
the former. Id. at 413. The translation from one to the other is fraught with various ambiguities
and anomalies that constitutional—and international—law scholars alike wrestle with still today.
New natural-law theories offer an alternative way to recognize these perfect rights as fundamental
goods. However, modern Supreme Court jurisprudence in both constitutional law and
international law has expressly declined to employ this deontological newspeak.
347. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749–51 (2004).
348. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 4 (paperback ed. 1993). Professor
Ackerman refers to these rare occasions as “transformative constitutional moments” in the
Constituion. Id.
349. Joseph P. Covington & Iris E. Bennet, Signs of Life in International Anti-Bribery
Enforcement: Recent Enforcement of Anti-Bribery Laws Outside the U.S. and Issues to Consider
for a Multi-Jurisdictional Defense Strategy, JENNER & BLOCK LLP 1 (May 4, 2009),
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs1252%5C2499%5C
covington%20%20bennett%20pdf.pdf.
350. Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.

1010

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:951

constitutionality of the speech suppression under the First
Amendment.351
C. Three Theories for Expanding Section 441e
The foregoing discussion establishes two things: first, campaign
spending by foreign-controlled or foreign-owned American
corporations is likely to be constitutionally protected; and second,
even assuming the First Amendment applies, the goal of preventing
foreign influence could potentially justify restrictions on the financial
participation of foreign-controlled domestic corporations in U.S.
elections. The remaining question is one of line-drawing. It is easy to
state that foreign influence in U.S. elections needs to be limited. The
challenge is in determining where to draw the line.
If Citizens United is to be distinguished in the context of
foreign-controlled corporations, then a clear, workable test must be
found. Ambiguous criteria invite disparate treatment and create due
process problems. Foreign-controlled corporations must be able to
predict when their actions conform to the law. And courts cannot be
expected to engage in case-by-case analysis in determining when
foreign influence over U.S. elections should be limited. Therefore, I
propose three possibilities: (1) lowering the standard of review from
traditional strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny; (2) resurrecting the
Austin/McConnell antidistortion rationale to justify extending
Section 441e to foreign-owned or foreign-controlled domestic
corporations; or (3) recognizing that preventing foreign influence is a
compelling state interest and that extending Section 441e’s ban on
coordinated expenditures is necessary to achieve that goal.
These three possibilities are supported by the HLP decision. The
HLP court did not address every potential First Amendment
implication of the anti-terrorism law at issue. Instead, the Court
concluded that the groups challenging the law failed to give enough
details regarding the political speech at stake to create a case or
controversy in a pre-enforcement action. Nevertheless, the decision’s
dictum shed new light on how to apply the First Amendment in the
foreign context.

351. As I hope to demonstrate in a future article, CIL best supports voluntary self-regulation
by multinationals and other stakeholders working with the public sector in a transnational legal
process.
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1. Lower the Standard to Intermediate Scrutiny
The HLP Court grappled with the proper standard of scrutiny in
the foreign context of that case. As discussed in Part III supra, if a
content-based restriction on speech involves core First Amendment
rights, it must pass strict scrutiny, which means it will almost never
be upheld.352 To date, the only case in the campaign finance law
context to uphold a restriction under strict scrutiny is Austin, which
Citizens United reversed.353 If a restriction is content neutral, then the
Court applies intermediate scrutiny. As the dissent points out,
however, the HLP decision is less than clear on which standard it
applied.354 According to the majority, the proper test was whether the
law is “necessary” to further a government interest of “the highest
order.”355 On the one hand, this sounds a lot like an inquiry under
strict scrutiny: whether the statute is narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.
On the other hand, the “necessary” language is broad enough to
capture any activity that would, directly or indirectly, advance the
state interest. In fact, the Court expressly reserved the question of
whether a ban on purely independent advocacy speech would be
constitutionally necessary to further the state interest.356 Therefore,
the HLP Court applied the intermediate level of scrutiny.357 Under
intermediate scrutiny a statute must further an important and
substantial government interest (such as protecting national security)
and restrict First Amendment freedom no more than is necessary.358
The material-support statute at issue in HLP easily survives this

352. A restriction is content based if it targets specific words, facts, ideas, subjects, or
viewpoints. E.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 329 (1988) (treating anti-harassment law as a content-based restriction on speech
subject to strict scrutiny).
353. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. Contra Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)
(holding that a state can ban campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place on election
day). A plurality of the majority in Burson upheld the restriction under strict scrutiny; however,
the deciding vote was cast by Justice Scalia, who did not apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 214–16.
354. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2734–35 (2010).
355. Id. at 2723.
356. Id. at 2724.
357. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 18, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009)
(No. 09-89), 2009 WL 2599325 at *18 (arguing that every court to have faced the issue has
concluded that the material-support statute is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which it easily
satisfies).
358. Id. at 4.
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lower scrutiny because its restrictions were content neutral and
directed at the particular forms of support the plaintiffs sought to
provide to foreign terrorist groups.359 This suggests that intermediate
scrutiny applies to any speech restrictions falling within the “foreign
relations” purview of the political branches. This would certainly
include preventing undue foreign influence in U.S. elections.360
2. Invoke a Limited “Antidistortion” Rationale
Alternatively, an antidistortion rationale could justify extending
the Section 441e ban to foreign-controlled domestic corporations.
This approach would require salvaging the antidistortion rationale
from the wreckage of Austin and McConnell, which Citizens United
overturned. To do so, the holding in Citizens United must be limited
to its facts, which involved a purely domestic source of potential
distortion. Under this reading, courts are free to deploy the
antidistortion rationale in cases involving a foreign influence.
Among citizens, it might be unfair to characterize a volume of
speech as distortion; however, when one of the speakers is foreign
controlled, the opposite is true. Campaign spending by a foreigncontrolled corporation is, by definition, a distortion of an exclusively
American political process.
Limiting Citizens United to purely “domestic” corporations
would also bring much needed coherence to the opinion.361 The Court
acknowledged that the right of association plays an important part in
determining a corporation’s rights. At the same time, the Court
insisted that corporate rights are independent of individual rights.362
Both propositions make some sense in the case of a domestic
corporation owned and controlled entirely by American citizens. In
359. Id. at 5.
360. See Bluman v. FEC, Civil No. 1:10-CV-01766, at 8 (D.D.C.) (Aug. 11, 2011), available
at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2010cv1766-37 (noting the FEC
position that § 441e(a) manifests a congressional judgment on a matter of foreign affairs and
national security, and is thus subject to deferential rational basis review, but concluding the
statute passes muster even under strict scrutiny). But see Rothstein v. UBS AG, 772 F. Supp.2d
511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that the Supreme Court’s finding in HLP that foreign
terrorist organizations (FTOs) “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to
such an organization facilitates that conduct is specific to FTOs” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
361. The decision can be read as limited to domestic corporations but not limited to nonprofit
domestic organizations since some funds used to make the movie were donations from for-profit
corporations. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891.
362. Id. at 883–84.
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that context, the corporation’s political-speech rights flow from the
rights of its underlying members as U.S. citizens, and in the
aggregate, these new corporate rights have their own viability.
However, if some or all of a corporation’s shareholders do not have
such rights, by virtue of their non-citizenship, it does not necessarily
follow that the corporation should be afforded any separate and
independent rights.363 It is one thing to argue that “the people”
protected by the First Amendment includes U.S. citizens, both
individually and collectively, but it is entirely different to argue that
the term was meant to include corporations comprising or controlled
by aliens. On the contrary, the U.S. government has a cognizable
interest in preventing foreign influence from distorting its political
process that is sufficiently compelling to justify a restriction on
foreign-controlled domestic corporations’ financial participation in
U.S. elections.
3. Categorize It as Coordinated Expenditures
Finally, dicta in HLP suggest the Section 441e ban can be
constitutionally expanded to speech that is impermissibly
coordinated with foreign principals. Congress, the FEC, and the
Supreme Court have all assumed, to one degree or another, that
political-speech rights do not extend to foreign participation in the
political process. It stands to reason, therefore, that those foreign
corporations should not be allowed to do indirectly what they cannot
do directly. Suppose, for example, the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) formed a wholly owned American
subsidiary, Drill Baby Drill, Inc. (“DBD, Inc.”), which then used its
revenue to help elect the U.S. political candidates most likely to
advance the interests of the foreign oil and gas industry. Should
Congress have the constitutional authority to pass a statute limiting
DBD, Inc.’s influence on U.S. elections? If so, how should the
statute distinguish DBD, Inc. from other American corporations? The
answer under FARA would depend on whether DBD, Inc. was a
foreign agent.
The approach under the treason-by-propaganda cases would ask
whether the defendant was an employee. Under Citizens United and
363. Of course, modern corporations often have both foreign and domestic shareholders. How
to resolve this difficulty is discussed later.
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HLP, however, such political spending may be restricted to the
extent that it is coordinated with a foreign entity, and the term
“coordinated” can be broadly defined to include foreign ownership
or control.
The independence of any expenditure by a foreign-owned or
foreign-controlled domestic corporation is inherently compromised.
The HLP opinion supports this conclusion by extending the concept
of impermissible coordination to speech “controlled by” and even
“directed at” foreign groups.364 Speech that is independent of any
foreign source, on the other hand, remains fully protected because
the HLP Court presumed that if the speech is independent, it will not
materially support a foreign group in any way. Conversely, speech is
not protected when the speaker has knowledge of supporting or
aiding certain foreign groups (the intent is not required) and the
speaker is actually controlled by or coordinated with the foreign
group.365
Although the particular foreign groups in the HLP case were
terrorist organizations, the Court’s two-prong test would theoretically
apply to any case triggering the general authority of Congress and
the executive branch over foreign relations.366 A foreign-controlled
organization is not only controlled by a foreign principal but also
knows its political efforts materially support the foreign principal. In
many respects, the discussion in HLP is parallel to the classification
of coordinated expenditures in Citizens United. In that case, the
Court recognized that coordinated expenditures can be treated as the
“functional equivalent” of direct contributions because they pose the
same high risk of corruption. In this regard, the FEC recently issued
a final regulation regarding coordinated communications that went
into effect December 1, 2010.367 The regulation applies the Court’s
“functional equivalent” test to candidates, political parties, and those
364. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2728–29. Although the language “directed at” is the most openended of the two statutory phrases, it has limited application in the context of U.S. elections;
therefore this Article focuses mostly on the “controlled by” language.
365. This is analogous to the reasoning used in the treason-by-propaganda cases. See supra
text accompanying notes 109–13. But see Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2734–35 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(concluding that finding that independent speech “benefits” a foreign terrorist group is not
enough to justify limits).
366. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2710–11 (balancing the protection of free speech with the
government’s interest in combating terrorism).
367. 11 C.F.R. § 109 (2010).
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who coordinate with them.368 Similarly, speech coordinated with a
foreign entity poses the same risk of foreign influence as direct
foreign speech.
Admittedly, there are practical and legal difficulties concerning
how to define legal “control” by a foreign entity. The easiest cases
are those in which a domestic corporation is the wholly owned
subsidiary of a foreign parent and is acting as its agent.369 The more
difficult cases involve multinationals. The DISCLOSE Act would
have drawn the line for what constitutes foreign control of a
domestic corporation at 20 percent of the outstanding shares. Critics
argue that line is arbitrary.370 This criticism is somewhat supported
by the Senate version of the bill, which adopted a 50 percent
cutoff.371 However, the Securities and Exchange Commission is on
record stating that 20 percent is, in fact, the minimum level of
ownership necessary for effective control of a corporation.372 In
addition, the same rule of thumb has been applied in other contexts,
like the ban on foreign broadcast licenses.373
In the end, the DISCLOSE Act would not have prohibited
independent expenditures or expression of any kind. Foreign-owned
or foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiaries would still have been free to
speak and write about any topic, even about American politics or
policies. The statute, as proposed, only prohibited speech that was
368. Id.
369. See 29 Op. Fed. Election Comm’n Dissent 1, 2–5 (1989) (arguing that treating
subsidiaries and their parents as a singular entity is not a novel concept, as it is done with regard
to all other corporate subsidiaries except those that are foreign-owned). The U.S. Supreme Court
recently declined to address the question of when a parent company and its foreign subsidiary
may be treated as a “unitary business” under a single enterprise theory because the respondent
raised the issue for the first time in oral argument. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011); United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 27–
28, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76).
370. See 156 CONG. REC. H5524 (daily ed. July 13, 2010) (statement by Rep. John Carter)
(“We have a Supreme Court opinion, a recent Supreme Court opinion, that protected certain First
Amendment rights of free speech, and this Congress and this administration immediately brought
to this floor and shoved through on a partisan vote a bill called the DISCLOSE Act, which gives
special free speech rights to some and bars other groups from having the same rights, which is in
the face of a Supreme Court opinion that’s taken place this summer.”).
371. See DISCLOSE Act, S. 3295, 111th Cong., § 101 (2010); supra text accompanying
notes 109–11.
372. See In the Matter of Request for Declaratory Ruling Concerning the Citizenship
Requirements of Sections 310(b)(3) & (4) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 103
F.C.C. 2d 511, 515–16 (1985).
373. See Addis, supra note 27, at 150–56 (discussing the stated justification for the 20 percent
rule in the United States as well as Australia, Canada, and France).
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coordinated with or controlled by foreign principals. The threshold
inquiry under the statute was not whether the speech would, in fact,
corrupt the political process. In fact, the statute did not purport to
stop foreign entities from gaining any unfair business advantage.374
Rather, the statute narrowly focused on maintaining fidelity to the
plain meaning of self-governance by only preventing foreign
influence in U.S. elections. To that extent, its restrictions would
likely have withstood First Amendment scrutiny under one or more
of the approaches outlined supra.
V. CONCLUSION
The DISCLOSE Act failed to achieve cloture on July 27, 2010,
and again on September 23, 2010; however, Democrats have vowed
to continue the battle in the 112th Congress. While Republicans may
not support the DISCLOSE Act in its entirety, there is considerable
bipartisan support for the provisions relating to foreign nationals. In
fact, there were over ten other campaign finance reform bills
circulating in the 111th Congress containing similar language
strengthening the ban on foreign influence in U.S. elections.
Therefore, the Supreme Court will likely have the opportunity to
resolve the First Amendment questions surrounding these reform
efforts in one form or another.
The Court should permit Congress to freely restrict foreign
corporations’ financial participation in U.S. elections based on the
extra-constitutional principles of sovereignty, national security, and
foreign relations powers. Theoretically, the Court also has ample
grounds to uphold similar restrictions on foreign-controlled or
foreign-owned American corporations. Even though they are likely
covered by the First Amendment, the speech of foreign-controlled
domestic corporations is directly or indirectly controlled by or
coordinated with foreign nationals. Therefore, the Court should apply
a lower standard of scrutiny when analyzing the restriction. Even if
strict scrutiny applies, the Court should apply an antidistortion
rationale exclusive to cases involving foreign influence.
374. There was a legislative proposal in the 110th Congress to give American companies a
private cause of action against foreign companies that seek to obtain an unfair business advantage
by offering or promising or giving a bribe or anything else of value to a U.S. government official
or political candidate. Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2008, H.R. 6188, 110th Cong.
§ 2(f) (2009).

Spring 2011]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

1017

Alternatively, the Court should classify the restricted political speech
as impermissibly coordinated with foreign principals, as suggested
by dicta in HLP. Either way Congress’s efforts are narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest—namely, to prevent foreign
influence or distortion in U.S. elections.
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